Discourses of Transculturality:Ideas, Institutions and Practices in India and China by Chaudhuri, Bidisha & König, Lion
  
 
 
 
 
Heide lberg Papers  
 
in  South Asian  
 
and Comparat ive  Pol i t i cs  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Discourses of Transculturality: 
Ideas, Institutions and Practices in India and China 
 
A special issue 
 
Edited by 
 
Bidisha Chaudhuri and Lion König 
 
Working Paper No. 67 
April 2012 
 
 
 
 
 
South  Asia  Ins t i tu te  
 
Depar tment  o f  Pol i t ical  Science  
 
 Heidelberg  Univers i ty  
 
 
 
HEIDELBERG PAPERS IN SOUTH ASIAN AND  
COMPARATIVE POLITICS 
ISSN: 1617-5069 
About HPSACP 
This occasional paper series is run by the Department of Political Science of the 
South Asia Institute at the University of Heidelberg. The main objective of the 
series is to publicise ongoing research on South Asian politics in the form of 
research papers, made accessible to the international community, policy makers 
and the general public. HPSACP is published only on the Internet. The papers are 
available in the electronic pdf-format and are designed to be downloaded at no cost 
to the user. 
The series draws on the research projects being conducted at the South Asia 
Institute in Heidelberg, senior seminars by visiting scholars and the world-wide 
network of South Asia scholarship. The opinions expressed in the series are those 
of the authors, and do not represent the views of the University of Heidelberg or 
the Editorial Staff. 
 
Potential authors should consult the style sheet and list of already published papers 
at the end of this article before making a submission. 
 
Editor Subrata K. Mitra 
 
Deputy Editors Jivanta Schöttli 
 Siegfried O. Wolf 
 
Managing Editor Radu Carciumaru 
 
Editorial Assistants Dominik Frommherz 
 Kai Fabian Fürstenberg 
 
Editorial Advisory Board Mohammed Badrul Alam 
 Barnita Bagchi 
 Dan Banik 
 Harihar Bhattacharyya 
 Mike Enskat 
 Alexander Fischer 
 Karsten Frey 
 Partha S. Ghosh 
 Namrata Goswami 
 Hans Harder 
 Julia Hegewald 
 Stefan Klonner 
 Anja Kluge  
 Karl-Heinz Krämer 
 Apurba Kundu 
 Peter Lehr 
  Malte Pehl  
  Clemens Spiess  
  Christian Wagner
 i 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
List of Figures         ii 
List of Abbreviations        ii 
Notes on Contributors         iv 
Preface and Acknowledgements       v 
 
 
Title/Author Page 
Introduction: Discourses of Transculturality: Ideas, Institutions and 
Practices in India and China 
Bidisha Chaudhuri and Lion König 
1 
I.   
Cultural Citizenship in the Age of the Mass Media: From Theory to Policy 
Lion König 
4 
  
Being a Governed Muslim in a Non-Muslim State: Indian Muslims and 
Citizenship 
Julten Abdelhalim 
19 
  
Good Governance in a Transcultural Context: A Case Study of E-
governance Initiatives in India 
Bidisha Chaudhuri 
 
31 
A Transnational Concept with Chinese Characteristics: The Changing 
Structure of the Chinese External Propaganda Apparatus  
Mareike Ohlberg 
42 
II.   
Shifting Tourism Images: The World Heritage Site Lijiang, China 
Yujie Zhu 
 
58 
Epilogue  
Bidisha Chaudhuri and Lion König 
69 
 
 ii 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
Figure 1: Homogenizing, Ascribing, Silencing and Delegitimizing Identities 
Figure 2: Percentage of Political Representation and Deprivation 
Figure 3: Voting in Lok Sabha Elections 
Figure 4: Sense of Efficacy: Vote Makes a Difference 
Figure 5: Madhyamam Weekly Magazine Cover 
Figure 6: State, Society and Governance in the Modern State 
Figure 7: Complex of Governance 
Figure 8: Five Principles of Good Governance 
Figure 9: Project Implementation Structure: Common Services Centres (CSCs) 
Figure 10: (Good) Governance: A Transcultural Framework 
 
 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
 
CPC   Communist Party of China  
CPD   Central Propaganda Department 
CPPCC   Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference  
CSC   Common Services Centre 
CSDS   Centre for the Study of Developing Societies 
DIT   Department of Information Technology 
EPLSG   External Propaganda Leading Small Group 
EPSG   External Propaganda Small Group 
FALSG   Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group 
GMD   Guomindang (Nationalist Party of China) 
GoI   Government of India  
IAS   Indian Administrative Service 
ICT   Information Communication Technology 
IFS   Indian Foreign Service 
INA   Indian National Army 
IPS   Indian Police Service 
IT   Information Technology 
JIH   Jamaati Islami-i-Hind 
LSG   Leading Small Group 
NASSCOM  National Association of Software and Services Companies 
NGO   Non-Governmental Organization 
OEP   Office of External Propaganda 
 iii 
 
PBSC   Politburo Standing Committee 
PRC   People’s Republic of China 
PTWLSG  Propaganda and Thought Work Leading Small Group 
SAP   Structural Adjustment Programme 
SC   Scheduled Castes 
SCA   Service Centre Agency 
SCIO   State Council Information Office 
SDA   State Designed Agency 
SDPI   Social Democratic Party of India 
SDSA   State of Democracy in South Asia 
ST   Scheduled Tribes 
UNESCAP United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia 
and the Pacific 
UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization 
VLE   Village Level Entrepreneur 
ZCC   Zonal Cultural Centre 
 iv 
 
NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS 
 
Julten Abdelhalim is an Assistant Lecturer in Political Science at Cairo University 
(Egypt). She is currently a Ph.D. candidate at the Cluster of Excellence Asia and 
Europe in a Global Context: Shifting Asymmetries in Cultural Flows at Heidelberg 
University (Germany), where she is working on a doctoral project concerning Indian 
Muslim Youth and contemporary conceptions of citizenship in North India and 
Kerala. She received her M.A. in Social Sciences in 2009 from Albert-Ludwigs-
Universität Freiburg (Germany), where she studied in the Global Studies Programme 
in Freiburg, Durban and New Delhi. Her research interests include citizenship 
studies, gender issues, authoritarianism, Muslim societies and youth in India and the 
Arab World. 
 
Bidisha Chaudhuri received an M.A. in Sociology from Delhi School of 
Economics, University of Delhi (2001-2003) and a European Masters in Global 
Studies (2005-2007) from the University of Leipzig (Germany) and Vienna 
University (Austria). She wrote her Master's thesis on Global Governance: Route to 
Governing Globalization—A Case Study of WTO. She has worked in several 
research institutions and developmental organizations in India, Austria and Sri Lanka 
on issues related to gender, governance, private sector development, trade and 
regionalization and information communication technology (ICT) for development. 
Currently she is pursuing her Ph.D. on Information Communication Technology and 
Governance in India at Heidelberg University, Germany. 
 
Lion König studied Political Science of South Asia and English Philology at 
Heidelberg University and at the University of Edinburgh (UK). He holds an M.A. 
degree in Political Science in South Asia and is currently pursuing his doctoral 
research on ‘Cultural Citizenship’ and the Politics of Censorship in India. In 2011, 
he spent three months at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) in 
New Delhi as a Visiting Fellow. Lion König is co-editor of The Politics of 
Citizenship, Identity and the State in South Asia (New Delhi: Samskriti, 2012).  
 
Mareike Ohlberg holds a B.A. in East Asian Studies with a focus on China from the 
University of Heidelberg and an M.A. in Regional Studies East Asia from Columbia 
University in the City of New York. She is currently finishing her doctoral thesis on 
“A Transnational Concept with Chinese Characteristics: The Concept and Practice of 
Propaganda Targeted at Foreigners in the People’s Republic of China” at Heidelberg 
University. Among her research interests are Chinese media, China’s role in 
international affairs, transcultural intellectual history, and Chinese Marxism in the 
21
st
 century.  
 
Yujie Zhu is a Doctoral Candidate at the Cluster of Excellence Asia and Europe in a 
Global Context at Heidelberg University, Germany. He earned his Master degree at 
the UNESCO Chair of World Heritage Studies at Brandenburg University, Cottbus 
(Germany). Since his Master study, he started to develop his professional career in 
the field of heritage conservation and sustainable development. He has participated 
in several empirical and academic research projects at world heritage sites in China 
and Europe. His research interests include tourism anthropology, heritage studies, 
and sustainable development of tourism in China. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 v 
 
PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
 
Transculturality is a conceptual novelty, and it is through discussion and exchanges 
in oral and written form that novel ideas are developed further and gather momentum 
and solidity. In this sense, we are grateful that we have been able to follow both 
paths: the articles that form this Special Issue of the Heidelberg Papers in South 
Asian and Comparative Politics were initially presented at the Joint Conference of 
the ‘Association for Asian Studies’ (AAS) and the ‘International Convention of Asia 
Scholars’ (ICAS) held at Honolulu, Hawaii, USA from 31 March to 3 April 2011. 
The presentations were given in the context of the panel ‘Shifting Facets of 
Governance in Asia: A Transcultural Perspective’, which was organized by the 
authors with the aim to scrutinize the concept of transculturality with meaning by the 
way of showing its applicability to different contexts, and to discuss its validity as a 
conceptual tool with an international academic audience.  
 
We are grateful to Subrata K. Mitra for attending the conference panel, and for 
subsequently inviting us to consider the publication of the presentations in the form 
of a thematic issue of the Heidelberg Papers in South Asian and Comparative 
Politics. The journal is a forum that makes this research visible and which gives us 
the opportunity to engage in an extended discussion on the issue with a larger 
readership. Subrata K. Mitra and Radu Carciumaru, the Managing Editor of the 
Heidelberg Papers have been most helpful throughout the publication process and 
we would like to express our sincere gratitude towards them. An academic 
publication is not possible without the meticulous readings by critical reviewers: we 
are indebted to the two anonymous referees who have commented on our work and 
have thereby contributed to the further improvement of the papers, deserve our 
sincere gratitude. The diversity of cases discussed here, and the different academic 
subject backgrounds of the authors are a result of the fact that all the contributors to 
this issue are members of the Graduate Programme for Transcultural Studies (GPTS) 
of the Cluster of Excellence Asia and Europe in a Global Context: Shifting 
Asymmetries in Cultural Flows at Heidelberg University, a research institution which 
brings together scholars of various disciplines and different areas of research 
spanning across the Asian continent. The Cluster is aimed at overcoming the 
methodological gap between the humanities and the social sciences, which renders 
possible comprehensive research into the processes of conceptual exchange between 
Asia and Europe, and the transformation these processes entail. Working together in 
this multi-disciplinary and multi-method environment has furthered our interest 
interdisciplinarity, of which this Special Issue is a result. We would like to thank the 
Cluster, its academic staff, and our colleagues for preparing the intellectual grounds 
on which this work could grow, and the Cluster administration for the financial 
support which enabled all of us to participate in the conference that marked the point 
of departure for this work. Transculturality is an important conceptualization that can 
help us to come to terms with the flows, shifts, and ruptures that not only affect, but 
increasingly constitute modern societies on all possible levels. With the help of case 
studies, this publication shows the broad applicability of transculturality, it 
emphasises the various facets that constitute it, and illustrates the dynamism inherent 
in the concept. Discourses of Transculturality: Ideas, Institutions and Practices in 
India and China thus constitutes an attempt to start a debate on the feasibility of 
linking theory with empirical studies spanning across regions and disciplines.  
 
Heidelberg, April 2012 
Bidisha Chaudhuri and Lion König 
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Introduction: Discourses of Transculturality:  
Ideas, Institutions and Practices in India and China 
 
 
 
Bidisha Chaudhuri and Lion König 
 
 
 
 
Most of the social sciences in the 1950s and 1960s have been heavily influenced by 
modernization theory, which focused on issues of economic growth, political 
development and social change, in order to develop a predictive model of linear 
progress for developing countries following a Western prototype. Most post-war 
policies were driven by this school of thought and somehow still continue to hold the 
undercurrent of the same philosophy. However, the realities and experiences of most 
of the non-Western countries did not truly reflect the predictions of modernization 
theory, and therefore prompted recent trends in social science disciplines to severely 
challenge the universalizing outlook of such a grand narrative. Transculturality, 
though conceptualized differently depending on the intellectual context, is broadly 
understood here as a research perspective that while challenging universalism, 
acknowledges the existence of ideas, institutions and practices across different 
cultural settings as a result of asymmetrical cultural flows. This perspective allows 
for transcending disciplinary boundaries by deploying concepts such as flow, 
asymmetry, hybridity, structure and agency as heuristic tools which are crucial in 
critically analyzing the meta-narratives of Euro-centrism and their implications for 
understanding non-Western societies in their own terms, rather than along the lines 
of Western parameters. Each of these conceptual categories becomes an important 
tool to address the particular contexts of a society in its entirety rather than fitting 
them into a given model. This does not imply a theoretical and methodological 
exoticism of non-Western societies, but constitutes an attempt to generalize from 
these societies in a more inclusive manner. As the title suggests, this special issue 
strives to comprehend discourses of transculturality as an emerging and alternative 
paradigm to analyze concrete concepts, such as citizenship, governance, identity, 
bureaucracy, diplomacy, and tourism networks in the specific contexts of India and 
China. These concepts, though already discussed earlier, will acquire a new edge 
when examined against the background of the analytical framework of 
transculturality. Bhabha’s (1993) notion of the in-between, Clifford’s (1997) trope of 
the traveller, and Pratt’s (1991) techniques of the contact zone as discussed by 
Schröder (2005) are some of the theoretical points on the basis of which, by a 
combination of theory with empirically rich case studies, transculturality is 
conceptualized.  
In this vein, all the papers in this issue strive to deal with the following basic 
research questions: 
 
1. What are the structural asymmetries that exist between Western discourses 
and the realities of the non-Western world?  
2. How do these asymmetries manifest themselves in the ideas, institutions and 
practices that are underlying the cases under consideration, and following 
from that, in how far do they shape our understanding of social science 
disciplines and their analytical frameworks and how can they lead to a 
reconsideration of these frameworks? 
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3. How do non-Western societies, in this case China and India, practice their 
agency to negotiate these asymmetrical conceptual flows in order to gain 
legitimacy in their own societies as well as with their Western counterparts?  
4. How do these contextual realities connect to wider theoretical 
generalizations and in how far do they help to develop alternative discourses 
of transculturality to overcome Euro-centrism in all conceptual 
underpinnings? 
 
The first two papers in this special issue deal with the concept of citizenship 
albeit in different analytical contexts and by using different theoretical approaches. 
The first paper entitled Cultural Citizenship in the Age of the Mass Media: From 
Theory to Policy by Lion König starts from the idea of citizenship as understood in 
ancient Greece. The author traces the journey of this dynamic concept much through 
the Western political and sociological thought and finally arrives at the context of 
postcolonial India. In his paper, König focuses on the particular notion of ‘cultural 
citizenship’ to emphasise the close connection between identity formations and mass 
media within heterogeneous realities of the Indian society. Drawing on the diverse 
approaches of political science, cultural studies and media analysis, König discusses 
the validity of the concept of ‘cultural citizenship’ both as a heuristic tool and as a 
hybridising strategy to improve a policy framework aimed at the management of 
diverse societies not only in the Indian, or Asian context but also in its Western 
counterparts.  
 
In the second paper, Being a Governed Muslim in a Non-Muslim State: Indian 
Muslims and Citizenship Julten Abdelhalim provides yet another investigation into 
the context of minority politics and citizen identity in postcolonial India. The paper 
grapples with the predicament of fitting Islam and citizenship within a democratic 
set up. Taking an anti-essentialist view on Muslim politics in India, the author 
explores the entangled nature of the citizenship concept by traversing through 
modern political theory, Islamic political thought and the postcolonial context of its 
adaptation. Following a distinctive methodological mixture of statistics and thick 
descriptions, Indian Muslims and their political agency are presented here as a 
unique case to confront the Eurocentric bias inherent in the modern 
conceptualisation of citizenship. Furthermore, Abdelhalim effectively puts forward 
possibilities of accommodating alternative paradigms of citizenship based on 
transcultural perspectives.  
 
Bidisha Chaudhuri in her paper Good Governance in a Transcultural Context: 
A Case Study of E-Governance Initiatives in India, which is also the last paper on 
India, explores the ‘good governance’ paradigm as an asymmetrical conceptual flow 
being implemented in the post-liberalised Indian context. Taking a critical stance 
against the inherent Western bias and modernising tendency of the concept, 
Chaudhuri focuses on the e-governance initiatives taken up by the Government of 
India as a step towards achieving ‘good governance’. In dealing with the continuous 
interplay of the normative structures of governance and the agency of the affected 
actors, the author takes recourse to the analytical categories of asymmetry and 
hybridity to enhance the understanding of the process of negotiations embodied in 
such interactions.  
 
Travelling further East, China is the context under consideration in the 
following two papers. The first one by Mareike Ohlberg titled ‘A Transnational 
Concept with Chinese Characteristics: The Changing Structure of the Chinese 
External Propaganda Apparatus’ investigates the conceptual flow of ‘public 
diplomacy’ to the Chinese institutional structure and bureaucracy as being 
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profoundly influenced by the Western debates. By deconstructing the Chinese 
concept of external propaganda and delving deep into the external propaganda 
apparatus of the Chinese government, Ohlberg seeks to establish a diachronic 
account of the same navigating through its entanglement in the transnational contexts 
of beliefs and practices. While connecting external propaganda with domestic 
concerns within a wider reform agenda, the author further explicates how 
asymmetrical flows of ideas, institutions and practices get absorbed and adapted into 
the Chinese context and in turn add to an alternative transcultural perspective on 
‘public diplomacy’.  
 
Moving from diplomacy to tourism imaginaries, the last paper Shifting Tourism 
Images: The World Heritage Site Lijiang, China by Yujie Zhu sets out to understand 
tourism discourse as a transcultural process which inexorably blends homogenising 
forces of uniformity and sameness with that of asymmetry and hybridity. 
Understanding the history of Lijiang as a story of transformation from a historical 
trade town to a commercial heritage site, Yujie Zhu in his paper effectively captures 
the processes in which continuous, yet non-linear flows of actors, such as 
international organisations, in this case UNESCO, Western and Chinese tourists, 
national policy makers, local governments, the local community, and the media 
deploy their agency and eventually alter the structures of tourism networks and 
imaginaries.  
 
The papers brought together in this Special Issue are all part of ongoing doctoral 
research at the Cluster of Excellence Asia and Europe in a Global Context: Shifting 
Asymmetries in Cultural Flows at Heidelberg University. Every author thus makes 
use of new empirical data collected in the course of their fieldwork in Asia, which is 
why this special issue presents its readers with new intellectual approaches to study 
non-Western societies with a renewed scholarly focus on the structure-agency 
interaction along with its crucial parameters of culture, power and governance. 
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Cultural Citizenship in the Age of the Mass Media: 
From Theory to Policy 
 
 
Lion König 
 
Keywords: Citizenship, Culture, Media, Identity, Hybridity 
 
ABSTRACT: 
 
This paper traces the conceptual evolution of citizenship from its 
origin in ancient Greece to its recent compound form of ‘cultural 
citizenship’. Citizenship, seen as the outcome of processes of 
adaptation is here understood as an avenue to enhance the 
understanding of transculturality, whereas ‘cultural citizenship’ 
with its link to the media sphere is meant to underline the multi-
discursive nature of both citizenship and culture. The 
understanding of ‘culture’ in the official Indian discourse is 
critically examined with regard to its implications for cultural 
policy, and the quality of different media is evaluated with respect 
to their potential for identity construction and -articulation. It is 
argued that in a constructive policy set-up, different media have to 
not only co-exist but be fused, as it were. Such hybridization would 
ensure that different voices participate in the same sphere of 
communication, thus making media a plurality-driven form of 
governance and avoid the creation of parallel structures which 
are likely to give rise to alienation and encourage feelings of 
difference among the citizenry. 
 
 
I. CITIZENSHIP: A CONCEPT IN TRANSITION 
 
Citizenship is a concept in transition. Its long history of conceptualization is a 
history marked by adaptations and ruptures. Different forms of citizenship across 
time and space have shown that it is a highly dynamic variable, constantly 
susceptible to change and modification according to the requirements in given 
politico-historical circumstances.  
 
Originating in the ancient Greek polis around the eight century BC
1
, the idea of 
citizenship entailed the transfer of a set of rights, including the right to vote, to a 
particular kind of person—the male, property-owning warrior—thus rendering the 
citizenship of ancient Greece exclusive of women, slaves, craftsmen or sailors (cf. 
Harrington et al. 2006: 61), in exchange for the duty to defend the polis against 
outside forces. In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries then citizenship 
became associated with the larger idea of the nation and was understood as 
membership of a state rather than a city (Harrington et al. 2006: 61, see also 
Brubaker, 1992). The citizen also has constantly evolved (with the rights and duties 
                                                        
1
 For a thorough investigation into the structures of citizenship in ancient Greece, see 
Manville (1990).  
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dichotomy providing an essentially stable core) and thinkers of various centuries 
have reflected on his or her role very differently
2
. Different conceptualizations from 
different historical periods—real or imagined—have however not existed in 
isolation, but have continuously informed each other: the French revolutionaries of 
the late eighteenth century for example sought to revive the “active citizenship that 
was believed to have existed in certain periods of antiquity” (Schama, 1989: 170)—
citizenship, like culture, thus does not exist in a theoretical vacuum, but is the 
product of ‘conceptual flow’ (Mitra, 2010; 2012a) across time and space. It is a 
concept of a transcultural nature, in the sense that it is a product of interaction, 
negotiation and adaptation, and in that it results from activity and creativity in 
contact situations
3
. The dynamic nature of citizenship becomes apparent through the 
striking differences between citizenship regimes that can be noted even when 
conceptualizations of citizenship are looked at synchronically, i.e. at a given point in 
time. Empirical research has for example shown that “conceptions of citizenship 
vary drastically between the UK and the US” (Oommen, 1997: 32).  
 
Despite the long evolutionary process of the ‘citizen’, full-fledged citizenship 
theory is a product of the more recent past. Citizenship only became a subject of 
scholarly interest in the twentieth century, with the seminal work of English 
sociologist T.H. Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class (1949), where a three-
dimensional model of citizenship consisting of civil, political and social elements is 
presented
4
. After a long dormant phase—Herman van Gunsteren in 1978, almost 
thirty years after Marshall’s publication, stated that “the concept of citizenship has 
gone out of fashion” (quoted in Kymlicka and Norman, 1994: 352)—citizenship 
studies re-emerged with the end of the Cold War and the ensuing fundamental 
changes in world politics, and citizenship theory broke through with all its 
complexity. Former theoretical approaches were called into question, and Marshall’s 
three-dimensional model was criticized for being based on social utopia. Fraser and 
Gordon, for example, argued against his concept of an increasingly just society 
showing solidarity by citizenship and claimed that “when questions about gender and 
race are put at the center of the enquiry, key elements of Marshall’s analysis become 
problematic; his periodization of the three stages of citizenship, for example, fits the 
experience of white working men only, a minority of the population” (1994: 93).  
 
Broadly speaking, two sets of criticism can be identified: the first set focuses on 
the need to supplement or replace the passive acceptance of citizenship rights with 
the active exercise of citizenship responsibilities, such as economic self-reliance, 
political participation and civility (Kymlicka and Norman, 1994: 355). The second 
set focuses on the need to revise the current definition of citizenship to accommodate 
the increasing social and cultural pluralism of modern societies
5
; a pressing project 
                                                        
2
 While “Aristotle’s ideal citizen is prudent, Cicero’s is honourable, Augustine’s is hopeful of 
salvation, Machiavelli’s is martial and Locke’s is productive” (Jandora, 2008: 3).  
3
 ‘Activity’ and ‘creativity’ are, according to Mary Louise Pratt, central features of 
transculturality. “Peoples […] do determine to varying extents what gets absorbed into their 
own [culture] and what it gets used for” (Pratt, 1991: 36, cited in Schröder, 2005: 201).  
4
 Arguing that the evolution of citizenship has been in progress for about 250 years, 
Marshall constitutes the ‘modern drive towards social equality’ as the latest phase. He 
proposes to divide citizenship into three parts or elements and distinguishes between 
civil, political and social citizenship. These elements to him contain the rights which are 
necessary to secure individual freedom, active and passive suffrage and rights to a 
minimum of economic welfare and security as well as the right to a share in societal 
wealth, respectively. 
5
 The question of how to accommodate diversity in modern societies is also explored 
theoretically with the help of the concepts of ‘differentiated citizenship’ (Young, 1989) and 
‘multicultural citizenship’ (Kymlicka, 1996). ‘Cultural citizenship’ draws on these, but also 
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that finds expression in the concept of ‘cultural citizenship’. The academic debate 
has responded to the new challenges by transcending Marshall’s original notion of 
citizenship and its connection with the territorial state; a process that resulted in the 
proliferation of ‘new citizenships’6. The mass of varieties of citizenship reflects the 
different political agendas of citizens and their perceived need to emphasise certain 
policy fields, which they feel are not high on the state’s agenda and yet constitute a 
vital part of their self-understanding as citizens.  
 
Citizenship today therefore is a social process through which individuals and 
social groups engage in claiming or expanding rights. Being politically engaged 
increasingly means “practicing substantive citizenship, which in turn implies that 
members of a polity always struggle to shape its fate” (Isin and Turner, 2002: 4). The 
dynamics of citizenship are in many cases tied to identity which is expressed through 
cultural claims. Thus, in contemporary citizenship theory, ‘culture’ more than ever 
before gains importance as means of articulation and also as crucial for belonging to 
a particular polity. The continuing rise of new forms of cultural politics, however, 
has challenged modern understandings of belonging and has contributed to a 
rethinking of the meaning of citizenship. Citizenship is thus not only an object of 
policy anymore—it has increasingly become a source and marker of social identity.  
 
 
II. CULTURAL CITIZENSHIP 
 
Despite the fact that Simon Schama in his seminal work on the French Revolution 
stressed the importance of culture in the making of the citizen, which in its modern 
avatar was essentially a child of the Revolution, born in the bloodstained streets of 
Paris, and devoted an entire chapter to it
7
, a theoretical debate about how people can 
become stakeholders in a larger political entity using the field of ‘culture’ as an 
avenue has only been taking place since the early 1990s, when the concept of 
‘cultural citizenship’ was introduced. It formed the theoretical backbone of a 
discussion on what explains people’s sense of inclusion and exclusion in a nation-
state and which measures can be taken to increase their sense of belonging—
citizenship has thus evolved from a one-dimensional to a two-fold concept entailing 
a legal right to the soil as well as a moral affiliation to it.  
 
Focussing increasingly on the cultural dimension of the social in the 1990s, the 
term ‘cultural citizenship’ has entered the debate as a supplement to the three 
dimensions of citizenship as outlined by Marshall. It is widely used by scholars from 
nearly all academic backgrounds in the humanities and social sciences; it has played 
a role in debates on educational democracy (Rosaldo, 1994), feminist audience 
studies (Hermes, 2000) cosmopolitan art (Chaney, 2002), and most lately even on 
scrapbooking (Hof, 2006) and colonialism (Nordholt, 2011). Given the diversity of 
the topics, the authors also approach the concept differently and emphasise different 
aspects of it, although some core parameters remain: the crucial concern of cultural 
citizenship is the question of identity, more precisely the provision of space for the 
                                                                                                                                               
constitutes a further development, as it links theory with policy; in the working definition of 
this paper, with media representation.  
6
 A glance at the table of contents of Isin and Turner’s Handbook of Citizenship Studies 
provides insight into these new forms: the list contains sexual citizenship, ecological 
citizenship, cosmopolitan citizenship, economic citizenship, health citizenship, liberal 
citizenship, republican citizenship, cultural— and multicultural citizenship, to name but the 
most widely discussed ones. 
7
 For a detailed analysis see Schama (1989), chapter four ‘The Cultural Construction of a 
Citizen’.  
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minorities by the majority. ‘Cultural citizenship’ relates to issues of representation of 
specific groups and is thus closely connected with identity politics. By entering the 
field of identity politics, which refers to groups that understand themselves as 
groups, the concept of ‘identity’ has changed from a descriptive tool to a political 
term (Hermes, 2000: 363).  
 
Issues of representation and identity also figure prominently in the UNESCO’s 
approach to ‘cultural citizenship’. The UNESCO Institute for Education has 
introduced the idea of ‘cultural citizenship’ as a “notion of collective rights to 
culture, implying the struggle for the reconstitution of indigenous cultures and 
communities which have been seriously eroded through conquest, colonisation and 
assimilation” (UNESCO, 1999: 7). UNESCO calls for a change in policy content, 
from a policy of assimilation to a concept of ‘cultural citizenship’, by making 
possible the participation of indigenous peoples at all levels of decision-making—
educational, cultural, developmental and political—in order to create within broader 
societies an awareness of the principles of mutual respect and equality, as well as the 
right to be culturally different
8
 (UNESCO, 1999: 7).  
 
A comprehensive approach to ‘cultural citizenship’ is given by John Hartley 
(2004) who defines it as  
 
“publicly acknowledged rights and obligations associated with cultural identity. 
Citizenship theory is concerned with how we conceive the rights and obligations 
implicated in membership of a political community as well as the identity that it confers 
on us. It focuses upon the necessity of such a membership either in the legal sense, to 
make society more governable, or as something to be desired for the purposes of 
inclusion, nationality or equality. Cultural citizenship concerns movement from the 
latter towards the former, a tendency that has become increasingly prominent since 
World War II”
9
.  
 
Hartley emphasizes the significance of the concept by taking recourse to 
Marshall and labelling ‘cultural citizenship’ a “recent addition to [T.H. Marshall’s] 
understandings of citizenship rights” (2004: 46-47); a conclusion which is also 
backed by Gerard Delanty on the basis of his review of the works on cultural 
citizenship by Kymlicka and Norman (2000) and Stevenson (2001).  
 
For the purposes of this paper, however, ‘cultural citizenship’ is understood as 
strongly linked to the audio-visual media, although not exclusively tied to them. A 
definition of ‘cultural citizenship’ with a strong focus on the media, which will be 
employed here as a working definition, was proposed by the German sociologists 
Elizabeth Klaus and Margreth Lünenborg who see ‘cultural citizenship’ as a 
theoretical approach encompassing “all those cultural practices that unfold on the 
background of uneven power structures and that make a competent share of the 
symbolical resources of society possible” (Klaus and Lünenborg, 2004: 200). Mass 
media
10
 are seen in this context as the “motor and actor of self- and at the same time 
                                                        
8
 This shows that the concept of ‘cultural citizenship’ has entered world politics, that it is 
taken seriously as an instrument to improve living conditions of marginalized people, and 
following from that, governance at the level of the nation-state.  
9
 The fact that the definition of ‘cultural citizenship’ was absent from an earlier edition of the 
same reference work in which the same author was involved (O’Sullivan, 1994) underlines 
the novelty of the concept.  
10
 Following a minimalistic definition by Judith Lichtenberg, ‘mass media’ are here defined 
as those media which draw mass audiences, have a wide penetration within a given 
population and bear a responsibility for presenting many sides of an issue. They are 
distinguished from ‘non-mass media’, whose purpose often lies in advancing a certain point-
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heteronomous production of individual, group-specific and societal identities” 
(Klaus and Lünenborg, 2004: 200).  
 
‘Cultural citizenship’ is deemed important here because it opens up a space in 
which meanings circulate, i.e. in which they are negotiated and then determined. 
Claiming that differences can occur between the media messages and readings by the 
audience, they state that ‘cultural citizenship’ is in fact a cycle of the cultural 
production of meaning. Since a media text is received differently by different 
audiences, the production side has to take this into account and has to transfer 
elements of that reception back into the text. Thus, they plead for understanding 
processes of identity formation on an individual, sub-cultural or nation-state level 
within the context of media action. The media text itself does not materialize societal 
relations of power, but they are inscribed in the text by the producers and are 
allocated to the text during the process of reception by the audience (cf. Klaus and 
Lünenborg, 2004: 201). 
 
‘Cultural citizenship’ in the form of participation in the media discourse puts 
emphasis on localized identities and thereby challenges any elitist attempt to govern 
the masses through this discourse. By denoting a turn “from passive endurance to 
active choice” (Schröder, 2005: 202), it is a transcultural concept as conceptualized 
by Pratt (1991) and Schröder (2005).  
 
By means of combining theory with empiricism, India, with her vast media 
landscape, and her experience in the management of diversity, provides an excellent 
case. The multicultural nature of Indian society has led the state to adopt hybrid 
modes of governance, such as different personal laws, a mixed economy and a three-
language formula, to give but the most prominent examples
11
. India thus has all the 
necessary preconditions for testing the usefulness of ‘cultural citizenship’, as a 
further addition to the country’s arsenal of hybrid strategies. 
 
 
III. CULTURE IN THE INSTITUTIONAL DISCOURSE: AN 
APPROACH 
 
In order to determine the relevance the concept of ‘cultural citizenship’ has for India 
and the state’s cultural policy, the governmental discourse on culture has to be 
disclosed.  
 
The Constitution of the Republic of India mirrors the country’s heterogeneity in 
the sense that it sees culture as part of citizenship. The legalistic concept of the 
citizen does not fail to give ‘culture’ a prominent place. A look at Part II of the 
Constitution, i.e. Articles 5 to 11, which define who a citizen is
12
 and Part III 
                                                                                                                                               
of-view or promoting the discussion of a few more narrowly-defined issues (cf. Lichtenberg, 
1990: 123).  
11
 For a thorough discussion of the hybrid nature of the modern Indian state see Mitra, 2012b.  
12
 Article 5 of the Constitution of India defines the citizen in terms of both territory (jus soli) 
and birth (jus sanguinis):  
“At the commencement of this Constitution, every person who has his domicile in the 
territory of India and— 
(a) who was born in the territory of India; or 
(b) either of whose parents was born in the territory of India; or 
(c) who has been ordinarily resident in the territory of India for not less than five years 
immediately preceding such commencement, shall be a citizen of India.” 
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(Articles 12 to 35), which lists the fundamental rights of the citizen
13
 as well as Part 
IV A, i.e. Article 51 A—inserted into the Constitution under the 42nd Amendment in 
1976, at the height of the Emergency—which lays down the ten fundamental duties 
of the Indian Citizen
14
, reveals that culture is both tied to right and duty, the right to 
conserve and the duty to value and preserve
15
. However, the Constitution does not 
provide a definition of ‘culture’, unlike India’s Ministry of Culture, which defines it 
as representing “a set of shared attitudes, values, goals, and practices”16 and 
constitutes that “a country as diverse as India is symbolized by the plurality of its 
culture”17, following from which the Ministry regards it as its foremost task to  
 
“preserve and promote all forms of culture. Towards this objective, the Ministry is 
engaged in a variety of activities, ranging from protecting and encouraging cultural 
endeavours at the grassroots level, to promoting cultural exchanges internationally; 
from programmes to preserve India’s ancient heritage to encouraging an array of 
contemporary creative arts. The Ministry’s task is to develop and sustain ways and 
means through which the creative and aesthetic sensibilities of the people remain active 
and dynamic”
18
.  
 
Culture is an essentially contested concept. The governmental discourse, 
however, is rather clear on the matter—a clarity which necessarily implies limitation. 
The discourse is limited in the sense that it suggests a narrow understanding of 
culture as a separate policy domain rather than as an all-encompassing context 
permeating every sphere of life, and in the sense that it basically sees culture as 
artefact. Balmiki Prasad Singh, former Culture Secretary (1995-1997) and Home 
Secretary (1997-1999) of the Government of India defines culture as the “diverse 
creative activities of a people—[referring] to literature; to the visual and performing 
                                                        
13
 The six fundamental rights recognized by the Constitution are: 
1) Right to Equality, including equality before law, prohibition of discrimination on grounds 
of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth, and equality of opportunity in matters of 
employment, abolition of Untouchability and abolition of titles. 
2) Right to Freedom, including the freedoms of speech and expression, assembly, association 
or union, movement, residence, and the right to practice any profession or occupation (some 
of these rights are subject to security of the State, friendly relations with foreign countries, 
public order, decency or morality, right to life and liberty, right to education, protection in 
respect to conviction in offences and protection against arrest and detention in certain cases. 
3) Right against Exploitation, prohibiting all forms of forced labour, child labour and human 
trafficking. 
4) Right to Freedom of Religion, including freedom of conscience and free profession, 
practice, and propagation of religion, freedom to manage religious affairs, freedom from 
certain taxes and freedom from religious instructions in certain educational institutes. 
5) Cultural and Educational rights, i.e. the right of any section of citizens to conserve their 
culture, language or script, and the right of minorities to establish and administer educational 
institutions of their choice;  
6) Right to Constitutional Remedies for the enforcement of fundamental rights. 
14
 See Article 51A of the Constitution of India. 
15
 Similarly, Article 27 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of the United Nations 
sets out the right to participate in the cultural life of the community as a basic human right, 
stating that “Everyone has the right freely to participate in the cultural life of the community, 
to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific advancement and its benefits.”  
16
 Interestingly enough, the first Annual Report on the activities of the Department of 
Culture, which was then integrated into the Ministry of Human Resource Development, itself 
only created in 1985, refrains from defining culture and merely states that it is “difficult to 
describe bounds and parameters of a living vital culture like the Indian culture” (Annual 
Report: Part II, 1985/1986: v). It is however important to note that ‘culture’ is used in the 
singular voice here, essentially suggesting a conceptual consensus.  
17
 Government of India, Ministry of Culture. Annual Report 2010/2011: 2. 
18
 Government of India, Ministry of Culture. Annual Report 2010/2011: 2. 
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arts; and to various forms of artistic self-expression by the individual (specialist or 
lay) or by communities” (Singh, ²2009: 48), and therefore only refers to the material 
side of culture
19
. When B.P. Singh criticizes the British colonial authorities for 
recognizing and promoting only such works of art “which could be kept hanging on 
the walls in museums or in individual homes”, while neglecting “the work done by a 
tribal girl in decorating her house or the walls of her home”, he himself promotes an 
idea of culture which does not go beyond the mere artefact—be it a material object 
or a performance. This is even more paradoxical, since he critically reflects on the 
colonial establishment of institutions, such as the Asiatic Society of Bengal (1784), 
the Fine Arts Society of Madras (1860), the Arts Society Pune (1873), the Bombay 
Arts Society (1888), the Punjab Fine Arts Society at Lahore (1922), the Delhi Fine 
Arts Society (1928) and the Imperial Library, Calcutta (1903), and the colonial 
teaching of courses on history and civilisation at universities while not giving 
recognition to subjects like aesthetics, art history or folk arts (cf. Singh, ²2009: 88). 
On the other hand, he praises the same institutional manifestation of culture in the 
form of the Sangeet Natak Akademi (1953), the Lalit Kala Akademi (1954), the 
Sahitya Akademi (1954), the National School of Drama (1959) and the National 
Museum (1954), as fora “to facilitate a dialogue among persons engaged in creative 
activity, and for the publication and display of their work” (Singh, ²2009: 53), 
regardless of the fact that both colonial and postcolonial cultural institutions lack 
dynamics and encourage conservation rather than innovation.  
 
Similarly, the seven Zonal Cultural Centres (ZCCs)
20
 set up in 1985 to provide 
facilities for the creative development of the performing arts, graphic arts, and other 
literary works” (Singh, ²2009: 56) suggest a geographical containment of culture. 
The formation of these Zonal Cultural Centres, however, was considered to be a 
‘truly historic’ event in India’s cultural efforts, whose declared aim it was to 
“emphasize cultural kinships that transcend territorial bounds” and to “arouse and 
deepen awareness of the local culture and how this diffuses into Zonal identities, and 
eventually forms the rich diversity of India’s composite culture”21. Culture was and 
is thus seen as an entity that can be geographically localised
22
, an idea that is 
artificial and dangerously close to the German Kulturkreislehre, the study of 
‘cultural circles’ of the early twentieth century, which claimed that a limited number 
                                                        
19
 This is not to deny the fact that Singh elsewhere argues that “culture is power” and a 
dynamic variable, potent, influential and able to release the dormant energies of a community 
(Singh, ²2009: 48)—these aspects, however, do not form part of his conceptualization of 
culture.  
20
 The Ministry of Culture divides India into the following cultural ‘zones’: (i) North Central 
Zone, with Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Haryana, Bihar and Delhi (ii) North 
Zone with Himachal Pradesh, Jammu & Kashmir, Rajasthan, Haryana, Uttrakhand, UT 
Chandigarh, (iii) West Zone with Goa, Gujarat, Rajasthan, Maharashtra, UT Daman, Due, 
Dadra, Nagar Haveli, (iv) Eastern Zone with West Bengal, Bihar, Orissa, Assam, Tripura, 
Manipur, Sikkim, Jharkhand, UT Andaman & Nicobar Islands (v) South Zone with Kerala, 
Tamil Nadu, Andra Pradesh, Karnataka, UT Andaman & Nicobar Islands, Lakshdeep, 
Pondicherry; (vi) South Central Zone with Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Karnataka and 
Andhra Pradesh; (vii) North East Zone with Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Manipur, 
Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland, Sikkim, Tripura.  
21
 Government of India, Ministry of Human Resource Development. Annual Report 
1985/1986: v. 
22
 Official India does not acknowledge culture as a dynamic concept, but this phenomenon is 
general rather than particular, as India shares this perception with the larger part of states in 
the world. Some issues arising from this perception, such as the distinction into ‘cultural 
zones’ can also be understood as the result of an administrative need. I would like to thank 
the anonymous referee for emphasizing this important point.  
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of such cultural circles developed at different times and in different places and that 
all cultures can be traced back to certain centres of innovation
23
.  
 
It has to be clear that the idea of culture is broad, cumbersome and adds 
conceptual confusion rather than analytical clarity. In fact, scholars have raised 
doubts about the usefulness of the term
24
 or have argued against employing it 
altogether for analytical purposes, like the English art and literary critic Herbert 
Read (1893-1968), who reminds us that “the cultured Greeks [...] had no word for 
culture”, and hence “it would never had occurred to them that they had a separate 
commodity, culture” (Read, 2002: 10). Following from that, for Read, culture is “not 
a separate and distinguishable thing—a body of learning that can be put into books 
and museums and mugged up in your spare time” (Read, 2002: 13), which is why in 
conclusion he suggests to stop using the word ‘culture’ altogether, as much as he 
urges to refrain from using the term ‘artist’ as “art as a separate profession is merely 
a consequence of culture as a separate entity” (Read, 2002: 23)25. He notes that “we 
shall not need it in the future and it will only confuse the present issue. Culture 
belongs to the past: the future will not be conscious of its culture” (Read, 2002: 13).  
 
With regard to the concept of ‘cultural citizenship’, these suggestions seem 
helpful. Adding the prefix cultural to ‘citizenship’ serves a crucial agenda-setting 
function: it stresses the importance of the cultural dimension and contributes to a 
more holistic understanding of citizenship and its policy outreach. Eventually, 
however, the term ‘cultural’ should be done away with, which would serve two 
important aims: it would visibly shift the concept from the academic to the practical 
political sphere and would decrease confusion by not understanding the cultural as 
separate, thereby showing that ‘cultural citizenship’ is more than the sum of its parts. 
A necessary prerequisite to understand the complexity of the concept of culture is to 
see it as multi-discursive (O’Sullivan et al.; 1994: 68) and relational. It is multi-
discursive, because it can be mobilized in a number of discourses
26
, and it is 
relational, because “the culture to which people appeal and on which they draw, 
itself consists of borrowings and exists only in relation to the Other” (Bayart, 1996: 
96)
27
. Therefore, culture is really trans-culture: every form of culture is always also 
a product of interaction and fusion; not an entity, but a fluidum. For the Indian 
                                                        
23
 cf. Encyclopedia Britannica (www.britannica.com). It should also be noted here that, 
because of its shortcomings this school of thought was short-lived: by the mid-twentieth 
century, most anthropologists considered cultural phenomena much too complex to be 
explained by the interaction of a small number of Kulturkreise.  
24
 Bayart (1996), see especially chapter two: ‘Should we stop using the Word “Culture”’?  
25
 Incidentally, Read borrows this thought from the English artist Eric Gill (1882-1940), 
whose phrase “to hell with culture, culture as a thing added like sauce to otherwise 
unpalatable stale fish” Read quotes at the beginning of his book (Read, 2002: 10) and who, in 
turn, was inspired by South Asian philosophy. Gill’s idea, Read notes, was informed by the 
Ceylonese Philosopher and art historian Ananda Coomaraswamy, who seems to have taken it 
from Sri Aurobindo (cf. Read, 2002: 23).  
26
 O’Sullivan et al. note that if the term ‘culture’ is used for analytical purposes, “it is 
unlikely that you will ever be able to fix on just one definition that will do for all […] 
occasions (1994: 68).  
27
 If culture is relational, so is ‘cultural citizenship’: in his discussion of ‘cultural citizenship’ 
in the Netherlands Indies, Nordholt (2011) claims that while the term was “primarily used to 
identify the position of ethnic minorities and other marginalised groups in the United States 
and in Southeast Asia and to explore their possibilities to achieve empowerment and 
emancipation” (2011: 439), in the context of the Netherlands Indies [it] should not be applied 
to marginalised ethnic minorities but to the indigenous middle classes who inhabited the very 
centre of the late colonial state” (2011: 440), since it was these middle classes that were 
denied access to political power.  
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government, therefore, it would be crucial to reconsider its understanding of culture 
and reformulate it along the lines of ‘being’ rather than ‘having’.  
 
 
IV. CULTURAL CITIZENSHIP AND MEDIA REPRESENTATION: 
TRACING LINKAGES 
 
After having outlined the conceptual difficulties of ‘culture’, and ‘cultural 
citizenship’, a few instances will be given to illustrate the role of the Indian media in 
the putting into practice of ‘cultural citizenship’. I am arguing that the media play a 
critical role in nation-building for two reasons. Firstly, cultural representation is 
fundamental to overcome bias and gain acceptance, because “how we project class 
sensibilities, identify with ethnicity or culture, or perform gender cannot be separated 
from the representations of class, race, gender, and sexuality we see all around us” 
(Linné, 2007: 464), and secondly, an absence from the media sphere further 
enhances the feeling of marginalisation: Rabindranath Tagore, for his part, deplored 
the state of representation of Britain’s biggest and most important colony in English 
papers, in whose columns “London street accidents are recorded with some decency 
of pathos, while they need take but the scantiest notice of calamities which happen in 
India over areas of land sometimes larger than the British Isles” (Tagore, 2009: 40). 
This feeling is as topical today as it was then. Different sections of society feel 
marginal and this marginalisation is further enhanced by a media discourse which 
does not consider their issues and viewpoints. The regional newspaper Nagaland 
Post, for instance, reported on Shiela Sengupta, Subhas Chandra Bose’s niece’s 
lament, that “the government at the centre was not paying due attention to Nagaland 
in spite of the contribution made by the people of the state to Netaji
28
 and his army”, 
which, as she put it, was “simple devotion to make India free”29. This perceived lack 
of acknowledgment can give rise to feelings of alienation or intensify already 
existing ones.  
 
If an inclusion of neglected groups into the media discourse can prevent these 
feelings, the policy-relevant question is, how can a democratization of the media 
sphere take place, and when are media democratic? Edward Herman defines 
democratic media as those media “organized and controlled by ordinary citizens or 
their grassroots organizations”, i.e. such that “involve individuals or bodies that 
serve local or larger political, minority, or other groups in the social and political 
arena” (Herman, 2007: 38). As in the model of ‘cultural citizenship’ by Klaus and 
Lünenborg outlined above, Herman suggests that the structures of such democratic 
media would enable a “horizontal flow of communication, in both directions, from 
the producer to the consumer and vice versa, instead of a vertical flow from officials 
and experts to the passive population of consumers” (Herman, 2007: 39). 
Democratization, Herman’s argument goes, can be achieved in essentially two ways: 
either by trying to influence the mainstream media to give more room to excluded 
ideas and groups, or by creating and supporting an alternative structure of media 
closer to ordinary people and grassroots organisations, with identifying the second 
route as “the only one that can yield truly democratic media” (Herman, 2007: 40). I 
would like to argue that in the Indian context, both strategies are implemented.  
                                                        
28
 ‘Netaji’, Hindi for ‘respected leader’ is the (unofficial) title bestowed upon Subhas 
Chandra Bose, the founder and Supreme Commander of the Azad Hind Fauz, the ‘Indian 
National Army’ (INA), and a prominent figure of the Indian Independence movement. 
Govindballabh Pant notes that “he displayed remarkable qualities of leadership and 
organisation and for these he has been appropriately given by the entire nation the 
distinguished title of Netaji” (Pant, 1948: viii).  
29
 Nagaland Post Online Edition (www.nagalandpost.com) (last sighted on 24 October 2011).  
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An example of bringing marginalized sections of society into the media 
mainstream by giving their issues an appropriate forum, would be the Times of India 
featuring a column entitled ‘Different Strokes for Different Folks’, written by the 
wheelchair-bound professor V.S. Sunder, “who wishes to use this space to remind 
people periodically of the special needs of the differently-abled members of our 
society”30. Another instance of margins entering the mainstream would be the 
increasing plurality of voices in the sphere of Indian literature today. Stigmatized 
sections of Indian society, sex workers
31
, homosexuals
32
 and transsexuals
33
, are 
engaging in the identity-constituting and –enhancing project of putting their story to 
paper, thereby putting into practice Rob Linné’s claim that “the sharing of stories as 
a way to create a shared identity makes special sense for those gathered at the 
margins” (Linné, 2007: 465)34. One of the latest contributions of this kind is A. 
Revathi’s autobiography The Truth About Me: A Hijra Life Story (2010). She 
describes her motivation to enter the media sphere as follows:  
 
“as a hijra I get pushed to the fringes of society. Yet I have dared to share my innermost 
life with you—about being a hijra and also about doing sex work. My story is not meant 
to offend, accuse or hurt anyone’s sentiments. My aim is to introduce to the readers the 
lives of hijras, their distinct culture, and their dreams and desires. I am proud of the 
results wrought in the state of Tamil Nadu by my book Unarvum Uruvamum. I hope 
now that by publishing my life story, larger changes can be achieved [...] I seek to show 
that we hijras do have the right to live in this society” (Revathi, 2010: v-vi).  
 
Media representation thus is not an end in itself. It is only the first step to 
awareness raising, toleration and ensuing policy change
35
. 
 
Alternative modes of communication—the second strategy outlined by 
Herman—are also existent, and some like the initiative Grassroots Comics—a 
Development Communication Tool, claim to act as an empowering device for the 
ordinary citizen
36
. While small-scale media produced on a local level, catering to a 
local audience and discussing local issues can have a more immediate effect, a 
presentation of the views of margins in the mainstream seems to be more appropriate 
than to confine a certain group to a certain medium. Periodicals like Dalit Voice, or 
Anglos in the Wind, a magazine that is edited and published by Harry McLure, an 
Anglo-Indian from Chennai, help to connect (literate) members of the respective 
                                                        
30
 Times of India, New Delhi, 24 October 2011. As this example shows, the proposed model 
of a democratization of the media by bringing the ‘margins into the mainstream’ is not only 
feasible in the context of publicly-sponsored media. Privately-owned media are also 
considering these steps. Many of the journalists and editors the author has interviewed in the 
course of his research see journalists in general and their respective medium in particular as 
taking a crucial role as mouthpieces for the voiceless and marginalised.  
31
 See for example Jameela (2005) for an autobiographical account of a female sex worker. 
The original Malayalam version of the book became a ‘controversial bestseller’ with six 
editions in one hundred days and 13.000 copies sold.  
32
 See for example Merchant (2009) who has collected and published poems by homosexual 
Indian poets when same-sex relations were still illegal under Section 377 of the Indian Penal 
Code.  
33
 See Revathi (2010) for the autobiography of a member of the ‘third gender’ community.  
34
 In this context, Linné refers to sociolinguist Shirley B. Heath’s conceptualisation of story 
as theory. Heath (1994) describes the possibilities narratives hold for facilitating informed 
and reformed actions as being especially relevant for those on the margins (cf. Linné, 2007: 
465).  
35
 In this regard it is also important to note that the enrolment form of the Unique 
Identification Authority of the Government of India lists the category ‘transgender’ as an 
alternative to ‘male’ or ‘female’.  
36
 For detailed information see Packalen and Sharma (2007).  
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communities, but would only in a rare number of cases reach out to the larger 
society
37
.  
 
To achieve the best results, the state and the private media sector have to work 
more closely together to bring about a further accessibility of the media sphere. If the 
civic sector is identified as the “locus of the truly democratic media” (Herman, 2007: 
51) community-run media have to be strengthened and a detailed government 
funding scheme will be inevitable to enable this sector to prosper
38
. Also, as far as 
the state is concerned, rather than measuring the effect of the media merely 
quantitatively on the basis of supply, (“radio as a mass media and the concept ‘radio 
for all’ will be roughly measured in terms of the number of radio receiving or 
transistor sets in the country”, Malhan, 1985: 135), the measure should be the degree 
of inclusiveness of reporting.  
 
What generally appears to be important is that the fellow citizen is also 
represented as such. Therefore, when the Republic Day Parade in India is preceded 
by a seventy-minute folk dance festival televised to the whole country, it less 
demonstrates “the country’s cultural pluralism and integral nature” (Singh, ²2009: 
99) as policymakers claim, but rather leads to the exoticization of a cultural ‘Other’. 
This particular way of representing cultural diversity renders a genuine consideration 
of different groups as citizens difficult and compounds their incorporation into the 
national community as equal members. 
 
 
V. CONCLUSION: ‘CULTURAL CITIZENSHIP’—A SUITABLE 
POLICY FRAMEWORK? 
 
As much as citizens are a “hinge between the modern state and the traditional 
society” (Mitra, 2012a), ‘cultural citizenship’, as obfuscating as it may be, is the link 
between culture and citizenship—it seeks to incorporate claims to cultural identity 
into the rights discourse opened up by citizenship.  
 
We learn from Rousseau, whose major work Du Contract Social was officially 
canonized by the French Revolution (cf. Schama, 1989: 175), that participation has 
an integrative function, “that it increases the feeling among individual citizens that 
they ‘belong’ in their community” (Pateman, 1970: 27)39. Since, as this paper has 
tried to show, ‘culture’ and ‘citizenship’ are deeply intertwined concepts, it has 
rightly been argued, that “cultural policy in general is one of the least studied but 
possibly most important domains for understanding what citizenship actually means 
and how it works” (Meredyth and Minson, 2001, xi-xii; cited in: Mercer, 2005: 10). 
This is especially true today, at the beginning of the twenty-first century; a time 
when the link between citizenship and culture is stressed and citizenship is 
increasingly perceived as “what cultural policy is, or should be, about” (Mercer, 
2005: 11).  
                                                        
37
 Incidentally, I only learnt about Anglos in the Wind by reading a one-page coverage on the 
Anglo-Indian community in Delhi in the mass medium Hindustan Times (Hindustan Times, 5 
July, 2011).  
38
 A possible role model here could be France, where the civic sector gets funding from the 
state through a tax on commercial advertising revenues (for details see Herman, 2007: 42).  
39
 In Rousseau’s logic, participation also helps to overcome the disruptive division between 
different sections of society, with the effect that there will be no people who like in 
Rousseau’s Emile when asked about their country reply ‘I am one of the rich’ (quoted in 
Pateman, 1970: 27).  
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A revision of perspectives informing citizenship policies is under way, but to 
this day there has been an under-theorisation of the significance of the cultural 
sphere in a participatory democracy. There is no consensus on what cultural 
participation implies, which is why it is used as an umbrella term to denote activities 
of individuals and groups in the making and using of cultural products and 
processes, as Murray (2005) states in her aptly-titled article ‘Cultural Participation: 
A Fuzzy Cultural Policy Paradigm’. Participation, it is argued, breeds social capital 
which in turn may lead to social bonding (within group identity), or to bridging 
(between group identities) (cf. Murray, 2005: 35) and can in that way strengthen 
citizen identity. However, the reverse is also true: ‘social bonding’ can lead to 
‘ghettoisation’, where groups define themselves against others by demarcating strict 
identity-boundaries, which hinder the permeability between diverse groups and 
undermine the very essence of citizenship, which is a common national identity
40
.  
 
Implementing ‘cultural citizenship’ along the lines outlined in this paper is a 
highly complex endeavour. A comprehensive framework would have to entail more 
than policy regulations for the media. India has a long and rather successful history 
of managing her diversity with instruments such as reservations and quota for 
minorities in educational institutions and the bureaucracy, the Three-language 
formula, the constitutional protection of Scheduled Castes (SC) and Scheduled 
Tribes (ST) and other measures of positive discrimination. The media are constantly 
proliferating, and citizens, very well-aware of their agenda-setting function see them 
as crucial instruments for participation, the voicing of dissent and ensuing political 
change. A tampering of the state with the free media is hardly desirable; a 
broadening of the spectrum to include the hitherto excluded into the discourse has to 
come from the media themselves. This paper has given some examples of how 
various media spheres can complement each other. The Indian state in the form of 
the Ministry for Information and Broadcasting has to see how community and 
alternative media can be furthered strengthened, it has to consider whether radio 
news can be de-monopolized, and it has to adapt the official conceptualization of 
culture to accommodate the increasingly visible range of social, sexual, and other 
identities.  
 
If India can take steps towards establishing a policy framework for ‘cultural 
citizenship’ along those lines, the achievement might be two-fold: it could help to 
increase (cultural) governance in India, and the Indian example might be able to 
provide policy solutions for the old Western nations with their new problems of an 
increasing heterogenization of a formerly ethno-culturally homogenous societal 
sphere. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
40
 I would like to sincerely thank the anonymous referee for emphasising this crucial point.  
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ABSTRACT: 
 
With the changing social fabric of Western societies and the rise 
of the minority question, fervent debates have arisen on Muslims 
living as minorities. Indian Muslims present us with an almost 
unique case of Muslims living in a democracy as an integrated 
part of the Indian citizenry and not as migrants or descendants of 
migrants. India acts as a model first for underlining the 
Eurocentric misfits in theorization on Muslim nations, and second 
for questioning established conceptions of political dissent and 
protest. This paper, consequently, seeks to provide an anti-
essentialist perspective to the discussion of Muslim politics and 
the dilemma of accommodating Islam and citizenship within a 
context of democratic governance. The case of Indian Muslims 
offers interesting insight into showing how transculturality can 
form a basic tenet of understanding citizenship in a postcolonial, 
yet democratic setting. Confronting the Eurocentric bias and 
simultaneously trying not to fall in its trap of essentialization and 
‘Othernization’ is a major task. This is attained by showing 
different and intriguing conceptualizations of political action and 
agency undertaken by Indian Muslims. 
 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION: THE REALM OF IDEAS 
 
This paper is driven by the urge to understand the puzzle of why Indian Muslims 
appear to have the highest sense of citizenship and higher rates of positive responses 
to democracy than the national average. Hence, it is argued that the case of Indian 
Muslims presents us with alternative hybrid and postcolonial conceptions of what a 
citizen is, as opposed to the liberal and republican paradigms. I will start by looking 
at the problem conceptually, then briefly outline the reality, and finally analyze how 
concepts and realities merge. 
 
Post-Orientalist Citizenship 
 
Through the historical moment of the Partition of India, and the creation of post-
colonial citizenship, India witnessed a theoretically legal adoption of a secular 
democratic system. However, the reality of the marginalization of the majority of 
Indian Muslims seriously questions the nature of Indian democracy. The process of 
adjustment to the secular and Western conception of citizenship, which was alien to 
Muslims and to their Islamic world view(s), is reproduced in today’s settings by 
accommodating their minority status to the reality of political and social life.  
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Here, I deem it most significant to make some remarks on the influence 
Orientalism and Occidentalism had on the elaboration of theories of citizenship of an 
occidental nature. Isin (2002) argues that the Western conceptions of citizenship 
entailed two fundamental perspectives: Orientalism and syneocism. Orientalism 
refers to the division of the world into essentially two civilizational blocks: the first 
is rationalized and secularized, and therefore modernized; the other is irrational, 
religious and traditional. In the Occident, notions of sovereignty, reason, and 
transcendence of primordial loyalties are configured. The second perspective is that 
of syneocism; a way of seeing the polity as embodying spatial and political 
unification. The first perspective gives the image of citizenship as a unique 
occidental invention, in other words, citizenship without kinship ties. As for the 
second perspective, the images are those of fraternity, equality, liberty and a unified 
and harmonious polity, which is why in syneocism, the citizen is seen as a secular 
and universal being (Isin, 2002). 
 
Moving away from the distinction between a sovereign rational Western citizen, 
and that of an irrational traditional Eastern subject, new constellations of democratic 
and universal perceptions gained importance. The introduction of concepts like 
'cultural citizenship'
1
 (Miller, 2002) is considered another intellectual contribution in 
this regard. These new conceptualizations help to understand how orthodox histories 
of citizenship have postulated the concept as the western outcome of ‘fixed’ 
identities, nationhood, indivisible society, ethnic homogeneity and exclusivity. These 
perceptions of ‘modern’ theorists of citizenship have ignored a crucial fact, namely 
that theories of citizenship were forged in relation to the imperial and colonial 
encounters of the West and the East as a justification of extra-territorial subjugation, 
followed by incorporation of the periphery into an international system of labour.  
 
Another attempt at theorizing citizenship in the postcolonial and globalized 
world is the theory of ‘differentiated citizenship’, which was first formulated by Iris 
Marion Young in 1989. This theory diverges from postmodernism in the sense that it 
recognizes the necessity of citizenship, but at the same time does not negate the 
particularities of group identities (unlike liberals and communitarians) (Gianni, 
1998: 44). Bhargava (2005) summarizes it as a theory that stands in contrast to equal 
citizenship. It arises when for example some citizens’ mother tongue is not the 
official language, and thus they suffer from a predicament of deliberation with 
fellow citizens, and consequently from a state of marginalization and discrimination. 
 
In postcolonial contexts, alienation of certain groups arises as a major 
challenge. Walzer (1970) discusses the differentiation between passive and active 
citizenship. According to him, the passive citizen is a recipient of benefits from the 
state which enables him or her to act freely in private spheres protected by the state, 
but he or she hardly plays a role in the public or political sphere (originally a Roman 
definition). The active citizen, on the other hand, has an interest in policy and in the 
question of who governs him and why. Thus, the meaning of civil society is 
broadened once political subjects begin to see themselves as active citizens. 
Differentiated citizenship refers to those citizens who are more active than others, in 
that they actually exercise power (Bhargava, 2005). 
 
Citizenship, being a modern concept, does not have any roots in Islamic 
political thought. The Islamic paradigm comes with different concepts and 
emphases, depending on the political context of the time. Linguistically, the word 
                                                        
1
 For a discussion of the concept see also Lion König, ‘Cultural Citizenship in the Age of the 
Mass Media: From Theory to Policy’ in this issue.  
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citizenship is translated now in Arabic as muwatannah, which comes from the root 
watan, meaning homeland or patria. The word is directly linked to wataniyya, 
meaning patriotism. In classical literature and during colonial times, before the 
nation-state was established, the masses would be referred to as al ahaly, from the 
root ahl meaning family. In Urdu, the word citizenship is translated as shehreyat, 
from sheher, meaning city. And this is where the ‘urban’ dominates. In Hindi, it is 
nagrikta, linked to nagar meaning city or town. The same is true for Malayalam, 
where the word for citizenship, paurutum, is derived from Sanskrit, based on pura, 
the city. 
 
The basic conceptual difference arising from transferring the discussion on 
citizenship from the Western liberal paradigm to the Islamic one is the context. The 
context of Muslims living as natural citizens
2
 in a liberal state differs from those 
living in illiberal states. Second, conceptual elements also differ. In the Islamic 
paradigm, justice is regarded as the highest value. I will limit the discussion here to 
the first case, that of Muslims living in liberal states. The interlocking relationship 
between justice and liberalism brings to the fore John Rawls as the thinker who 
extensively dealt with this issue. He saw society as “a fair system of co-operation 
between reasonable and rational citizens regarded as free and equal” (Rawls, 1993: 
103). Andrew March has worked on theorizing Islamic citizenship within a liberal 
framework. He stressed that living in liberal constitutional arrangements gives 
Muslims the benefit of not being obliged to assimilate, convert, abandon their 
religious beliefs, being forced to endorse a certain belief, or being required to act 
against their religious beliefs. In March’s (2005) words “they benefit from a system 
that does not see society primarily as united in a single common purpose but rather 
as the just management of multiple private purposes” (March, 2005: 322). Once we 
include the Islamic paradigm in the discussion, we have to be aware of the 
conceptual differences in dealing with the conceptions of society, of ‘the Other’, and 
of the individual. An Islamic doctrine of recognition of ‘the Other’ would consist of 
variations on the following positions: on asserting the fact of pluralism; justice 
across communities; concern for the welfare of non-Muslims; and shared ends. 
 
In Islamic political jurisprudence, the world is divided into several zones; those 
of Islam (dār al-islām), and those of non-Islam (dār al-harb). In the jurisprudence of 
minorities (a new branch of ijtihad on the affairs of Muslims), several points have to 
be clarified. The Quranic view of minorities includes two models for minorities to 
follow; the first is the Meccan model, or the muhajir (immigrant), in which Muslims 
facing persecution opted for hijra (emigration); the second is the Abyssinian model, 
or the mujahid (struggler), in which a state of tolerance and peaceful co-existence 
was achieved within a non-Muslim majority context through exerting extra effort 
(jihad) (Krämer et al., Oxford Islamic studies online). Some theoreticians opted for 
an adaptation of the already established divisions of dār al-islām and dār al-harb 
like Al-Alwany who defines dār al-islām to include all lands where the Muslims’ 
belief is secure even though this may occur among a non-Muslim majority, and 
conversely dār al-harb to include areas where the believer’s religion is not safe even 
though all inhabitants adopt the Islamic belief and civilization (Al-Alwani, 2000). 
 
Other theorists depended on older jurists who sought to devise new conceptions 
describing their political reality. Since Islam recognizes the concept of watan 
(homeland) in purely theological terms, India was not viewed as either dar-al-Islam, 
                                                        
2
 When speaking of ‘natural citizens’, I purposefully differentiate between the case of 
Muslims in India who are citizens of the soil, and the case of Muslims in Europe and North 
America, who are immigrants and thus indirectly acquired the citizenship by naturalization. 
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or dar-ul-kufr or even dar-al-harb. It was looked upon as dar-al-ahad, dar-al-aman, 
and watan (Shahabuddin and Wright, 1987: 157). Another example is that of the 
hanafites
3
 of South Asia who invented the term dar al-hind, or the abode of India 
(Khalfaoui, 2008). In contemporary India, scholars like Asghar Ali Engineer, and 
Akhtarul Wasey share the conviction that India is considered dar-ul şulh or the 
abode of treaty, of conciliation. This demonstrates how scholars of Islamic studies 
have adopted a mechanism of pragmatic compliance with the secular democratic 
system. March (2005) explains this as follows: 
 
“The civic duty to accept liberal freedoms in a liberal democracy should not be confused 
on the part of believing Muslims with a wholesale adoption of a liberal lifestyle. 
Muslims are not required to submit to the ‘relativization’ of the tenets of morality or to 
radically reform their understanding of what is halal (permitted) and what is haram 
(forbidden) in Islam. Nor are Muslims required to abandon the notion of Islam as a 
communal faith requiring the inculcation of morality and the confrontation of sin through 
collective efforts. All that is required is the acceptance of the liberal restraints described 
above as the activities of inculcation and confrontation. At the same time, the long-term 
affirmation of citizenship in a liberal democracy requires more than a simple tactical 
agreement to obey the law out of fear of punishment. At some level it requires the belief 
that the laws themselves may be reasonable or just” (March, 2005: 342).  
 
Figure 1: Homogenizing, Ascribing, Silencing and Delegitimizing Identities 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Drawn by the author. 
 
The discourse on citizenship of Indian Muslims suffers from two problems of 
essentialization: first, homogenizing the identity of the Indian Muslims, and second, 
overburdening this homogenized entity with certain identities. The inclusion of some 
strata of the Indian Muslims in the discussion of subaltern identities
4
 was a step 
towards revisiting the essentialist methods of discussing Muslim identities and 
histories. In addition to this, it led to the ascription of what Gooptu (2001) described 
as an inherently oppositional and resistant, even insurgent mentality or 
consciousness with regard to the subaltern classes (see figure 1). However, what 
remains controversial is the process of homogenization of Muslim identity and 
presenting it within a discourse of backwardness. The discourse on Indian Muslims 
usually neglects the vast divisions between the different Muslims in India. The North 
Indian most often monopolizes the discussion, leaving the South Indian outside the 
picture. In addition to this, the great variations along regional lines, coupled with 
class aspects, show us the rift between different positions of Muslims as well as 
between the elites (be it a religious elite or a secular one) and the masses (also be it 
orthodox, revivalist, or secularist). As Shahabuddin and Wright (1987) contend: 
“The modernists and secularists may be relatively few in number, but they wield 
influence disproportionate to their number because of their superior access to the 
media and their build-up by the national parties and leadership” (Shahabuddin and 
Wright, 1987: 173). Another eye-opener when trying to analyze the situation of 
Muslims in India is the critical attitude to the ‘language of minoritism’, and the 
                                                        
3
 Hanafites are those belonging to the Hanafi section of Islamic jurisprudence; one of the four 
groups of jurisprudence in Sunni Islam. 
4
 See for example Pandey (2009) and Chaturvedi (2000). 
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question in how far it could be deconstructed or reconstructed to explain socio-
political behaviour, or as Mushirul Hasan (1997) argues to “uncover the motives of 
those practitioners of modern-day politics who purported to represent the millat, or 
the ‘community’ as a whole, but were actually exploiting Islam and communitarian 
solidarity as a shield to cover their political designs” (Hasan, 1997: 51).  
 
A second dilemma is that Muslims are usually attributed a transcultural identity 
embodied in the notion of the Ummah; reflecting a Pan-Islamic nature. Ummah 
consciousness derives from the Quranic imposed duty on those “who have attained 
to faith, enjoining upon one another patience in adversity (sabr) and [enjoining] 
upon one another compassion (marhammah) (90: 17)”. Patience is not an argument 
in favour of inaction. In the Quranic meaning, sabr is a positive concept that brings 
out the best in man, separating the weak from the strong. The exercise of 
marhammah as the twin attribute of sabr ensures an individual’s continued 
adherence to human values and acts as a brake against savage impulses (Krämer et 
al., Oxford Islamic studies online). This topic was largely discussed by the Egyptian 
Azhar reformist Muhammad Abduh in the early twentieth century. Without going 
into deeper analysis of the applicability of this identity to contemporary Indian 
Muslims, suffice it to say that this identity has been utilized by the right-wing forces 
in India to deny Muslims the character of patriotism or nationalism. The Nationalist 
Muslim was devised to implicitly suggest the ‘Otherness’ of Muslims in India. As 
Pandey (1999) argued: “two terms that have gained common currency in the 
discourse on the “Muslim question […] [t]hough both date to before 1947, they 
came to acquire a new urgency-even a new meaning-with the Partition and 
Independence of that year. The first is the figure of the ‘Nationalist Muslim’, the 
second the notion of ‘minority’ and ‘majority’” (Pandey, 1999: 609). 
 
The everyday life of a Muslim is not void of Islamic symbols, meanings, and 
conceptions. But when looking at the historical junction of partition and those who 
chose to stay in India, even the Muslim Ulama employed, and still in today’s India 
employ, the Western language of secularism and democracy. We should also not 
forget that: 
It was the secular and democratic regime, rather than the Islamic dimension, that 
provided the overarching framework to build new political networks and electoral 
coalitions […]. They had to seek adjustments not as Muslims per se but as members of 
a larger collectivity. They had to accept state laws enacted by parliament and not insist 
on the application of Islamic law except where marriage, divorce and· inheritance 
were concerned (Hasan, 1997: 188). 
 
A female Muslim librarian in a madrasa on the outskirts of Lucknow told me: 
“Muslims feel injustice after Babri Masjid5; they feel deprived of their dignity, 
shocked and are in sorrow. However, there is no risk for Muslims living in India 
because Allah protects us and we try to build our future ourselves through what 
Allah has destined for us” (Interview at Jamiatul Mominat al-Islamia, Lucknow).  
 
Gender-related issues pose additional complications to the practice of 
citizenship rights among Muslims in India. The power structures governing those 
who can discuss problems of Muslims often not only neglect the gender aspect, but 
also seek to silence those voices calling for the inclusion of the gender perspective. 
                                                        
5
 On 6
th
 December, 1992, massive mobs of right-wing Hindutva supporters known as the 
‘Karsevaks’ demolished the sixteenth-century Babri mosque in Ayodhya in the State of Uttar 
Pradesh. Several officials claim that the destruction of the mosque was previously planned as 
it was a contested site attributed to the birthplace of the Hindu God Ram.  
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The legitimacy of reformers and the question of who has the right to call for reforms 
are the greatest obstacles for any discussion on women’s rights or betterment in 
India. This is also a very complicated issue to discuss. Generalizations cannot be 
enacted here, but as an overall observation, I had noticed how the sense of political 
agency of the North Indian female students seemed stronger. In one of my 
conversations with madrasa students in Lucknow, they were surprised when I asked 
them if they are going to vote, they exclaimed: “Of course! We live in a country 
where our Chief Minister and our President
6
 are both women”. In my conversations 
with these young Muslim women, it was evident how this sense of agency is evident 
but limited to the practise of their political rights. It was also noted how the secular 
system provided them with a freedom to also practise their cultural rights but when it 
came to their civil rights, it was this same secular system that had deprived them of 
the ability to be equal with other women and to overcome the patriarchal 
domination. When I asked other female students at Jamia-Millia Islamia University 
in New Delhi about their opinion of democracy in India, I was told: “As a Muslim I 
do not feel the state is just, but as a citizen, yes I feel so”. One of the female students 
in an Arabic college in Kerala told me: “As an Indian, yes I am a citizen in a 
democratic country, but as a woman, I am not.” 
 
 
II.  WHEN STATISTICS SPEAK 
 
In addition to the theoretical input, quantitative data serve to negate the intuitive and 
hegemonic remarks on Muslims’ participation in the democratic process. The nature 
of urbaneness of Indian Muslims should be emphasized and conceptually related to 
the integral premise that citizenship is an urban value. Although India is mainly a 
rural country, Muslims predominantly live in urban areas. The level of urbanization 
among the Muslim population is higher than the average level. In 2001, 35.7 percent 
of the Muslim population was urban compared to 27.8 percent of the overall 
population. Several hegemonic discourses govern the lives of Indian Muslims, 
especially those living in the North. I could divide these discourses into the political 
(that of terrorism and the portrayal of Muslims as potential terrorists), the ideological 
(the Hindu-nationalistic discourse and its claims that Muslims are anti-Indian or 
disloyal and the questions of secularism), and the socio-economic (that of 
marginalization and backwardness). Likewise, the first detailed and government-
commissioned report on the social, economic and educational conditions of Muslims 
in contemporary India (known as the ‘Sachar Committee Report’), which was 
presented to the Parliament in 2006
7
 divided the problems of Muslims into the 
following categories: identity-related, security-related, equity-related issues. 
 
Identity and security-related aspects are closely interlinked with political and 
ideological discourses, which are in turn related to socio-economic ones. 
Considerable media evidence reports the increasingly politicized actions of the 
Indian police, and how some factions of the governing party and local bodies have 
used the police against minorities. In addition to this, in many ethnic conflicts in 
Punjab, Gujarat, West Bengal and Uttar Pradesh, the police have been ineffective 
(Weiner, 1997: 488). One of the major triggers of this is the visibility of Muslims in 
public spaces. Lack of security due to the fear of an outbreak of ethnic violence and 
police impartiality led to the shrinkage of safe spaces for women and the 
                                                        
6
 These are the then-Chief Minister of the State of Uttar Pradesh, Mayawati (1995, 1997, 
2002-2003, and 2007-2012), and the President of India, Pratibha Patil (since 2007).  
7
 Report on Social, Economic and Educational Status of the Muslim Community of India 
(Sachar Committee Report, 2006). For the complete report see 
http://minorityaffairs.gov.in/sites/upload_files/moma/files/pdfs/sachar_comm.pdf. 
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transformation of common public spaces into segregated ones. Thus, an apparent 
clash with citizenship ideals appears (when the feeling of being at home gets re-
defined). This self-imposed ghettoization, which was nurtured by fear, led to another 
complicated chain of deterioration on socio-economic levels. There is a reported 
shortage and neglect by municipal and government authorities of infrastructure 
(water, electricity, sanitation, roads, and transport facilities), as well as schools, 
public health facilities, banking facilities and ration shops. This undeniably led to 
poverty and sustained low levels of education due to poor access to school and 
pessimistic perceptions of children’s futures. The literacy rate among Muslims in 
2001 was 59.1 percent, which is far below the national average of 65.1 percent. The 
Sachar Committee Report (2006) also showed the dismal percentage of 
representation of Muslims in governmental institutions and offices, whether it was 
law enforcement bodies such as the police, or administrative services (3 percent in 
the Indian Administrative Service (IAS), 1.8 percent in the Indian Foreign Service 
(IFS), and 4 percent in the Indian Police Service (IPS)). As for the Parliament, 
Ansari (2006) lists the numbers of Muslim members and shows the percentage of 
political deprivation accordingly (see figure 2). 
 
Figure 2: Percentage of Political Representation and Deprivation 
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Source: Ansari (2006).  
 
False perceptions of Muslims prevail, the first of which is that they do not 
support democracy and their political nature is essentially communalistic. However, 
findings of a survey in 1971 showed that two thirds of Muslims were satisfied with 
territorial non-communal representation (Nandy, 1975). In 1975, Nandy conducted 
studies on the acceptability of democratic norms and could not find any differences 
in respect of support for the democratic norms among Muslims and Hindus. 
Intergroup differences occurred in the sense that Muslims blamed the police more 
frequently (Hasan, 1987), and in so far as they were more often dissenters and 
outsiders (Nandy, 1975). On symbolic issues, such as the destruction of the Babri 
Masjid and support for a separate personal law, there is a notably sharp difference 
between Hindus and Muslims (32 percent vs. 86 percent and 41 percent vs. 67 
percent, respectively). However, when it comes to a sense of personal efficacy and 
legitimacy of the political system, Muslims’ percentages are slightly higher than 
those of Hindus (60 percent of Muslims believe their vote matters, as compared to 58 
percent for Hindus; 72 percent of Muslims believe that better government is not 
possible without parties, assemblies and elections as compared to 68 percent for 
Hindus (Mitra and Singh, 1999). 
 
The State of Democracy in South Asia Report (2008), compiled by the 
researchers of the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies (CSDS) in New 
Delhi, shows that the attitude of Muslims towards the satisfaction with democracy 
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does not differ significantly from the Indian average, on the contrary, it actually 
exceeds the average by 3 percent since 38 percent of Indians are somewhat satisfied 
with democracy, whereas the Muslims score a percentage of 41 percent. As for 
voting patterns, except for the 2004 elections, the percentage of participation of 
Muslims in the voting process was higher than the all India average (see figure 3)
8
. 
As far as membership in organizations is concerned, there was a shift in 2009 that 
reflected a much higher percentage: from 2 percent in 2004, to around 13 percent in 
2009. However, there is no great difference again between the Muslim and the all-
India average level. The sense of efficacy is an important indicator of the strength of 
democracy. Here there are again no significant divergences between the Muslim and 
the all India average levels. However, when the all-India sense of efficacy declined 
in 2009, a mutual decline in the Muslim variable was witnessed (State of Democracy 
in South Asia Report, 2008) (see figure 4)
9
.  
 
Figure 3: Voting in Lok Sabha Elections 
 
Source: National Election Studies, CSDS, New Delhi. 
Figure 4: Sense of Efficacy: Vote Makes a Difference 
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Source: National Election Studies, CSDS, New Delhi. 
 
                                                        
8
 The National Election Studies conducted by the Center for the Study of Developing 
Societies (CSDS) in New Delhi had a sample of around 35,000 voters across India, which 
was drawn using the multistage stratified random sampling technique. For more information 
on these studies, see: Lokniti (Programme for Comparative Democracy) 
http://www.lokniti.org/national_election_study2009.html#tm.  
9
 For measuring the sense of political efficacy, the following question was asked by CSDS: 
Do you think your vote has effect on how things are run in this country or do you think your 
vote makes no difference? 
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III. INTERACTION BETWEEN THE TWO REALMS: POLITICIZING 
RELIGION AND RELIGIONIZING POLITICS 
 
The Indian experience is fascinating with regard to how the different Indian Muslims 
all over India have devised new Islamic perspectives on religious pluralism and 
techniques for social and political action, and thus have creatively managed to 
accommodate and apply the concept of democratic citizenship. The following is a 
summary of the main points I perceive to be most relevant in this regard. 
 
1. Building alliances with other marginalized groups and overcoming the vote 
bank ideology 
 
“There is no puzzle to why Muslims have a higher sense of citizenship: it is usually 
the marginalized that have an idea of citizenship because they are the ones at the 
receiving end” (A Keralite Christian lecturer; personal conversation). 
 
Different political forces in India have sought to build alliances with other 
marginalized, deprived, or oppressed groups, as partners in political struggles. 
Interestingly, many Islamists have taken up the cause of the struggle of Dalits, tribal 
groups, and women. Feminist voices have even found space within the publications 
of some of the Islamist media, for example on the pages of the Madhyamam weekly 
magazine, which is affiliated to the Jaamti Islami-i-Hind in Kerala and now among 
the leading weekly magazines in South India. This magazine is known to publish 
different views relating to issues of Muslims, Dalits, and women (see figure 5).  
 
Figure 5: Madhyamam Weekly Magazine Cover  
 
 
Another important point is the manifesto of the Social Democratic Party of 
India (SDPI) which was born out of the Popular Front of India in Kerala. This 
manifesto states that “SDPI is a party launched to empower Muslims and other 
deprived communities. It is time to bid goodbye to tactical voting and go for 
strategic plans designed to achieve adequate representation in legislative bodies” 
(SDPI manifesto, 2009).  
 
2. Theorizing Darul Islam and Darul Hind 
 
Darul hind was a term invented by the South Asian hanafi jurisprudents (Khalfaoui, 
2008). It adds to the numerous terms coined to describe the situation of Muslims in 
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India and the question which jurisprudence they should follow. Interestingly, when I 
asked many of the Northern Indian ulema if they use any special fiqh alaqaliyaat, or 
minorities’ jurisprudence10, they were not only puzzled and did not know what I was 
talking about, but they also emphasized that they follow the hanafi mazhab as it is 
because there is a clear separation between the public and the private space. To 
them, the Muslim Personal Law meant shariah, and having it was sufficient for them 
to be content. The political aspect of Islam was never a source of concern. As 
criticized by others, especially their southern counterparts, they had chosen the 
material life and their own personal gains. They were disloyal to Islam in some way 
because they had neglected the fact that the Muslim Personal Law was not an 
identical copy of shariah, and that Muslims ideally should live under Muslim power.  
 
The history of the inclusion of darul Hind in the realm of darul Islam can be 
traced back to the colonial struggle which culminated in theoretical debates swinging 
between pan-Islamism and nationalism. In contemporary India, the including of the 
word national in the name of Muslim political parties in Kerala sends a specific 
message. The stress on India as the nation instead of the pan-Islamic identity is 
another point worth focusing on. 
 
Linked to this is also the significance of ghettoization in understanding the way 
secularism works in India. It is often true that the establishment and realization of 
darul Islam would require a ghettoization to be able to be a Muslim. This led to the 
creation of a dual identity; that of a secular citizen and that of a Muslim. I asked a 
female student at Jamia Millia Islamia University in New Delhi if the Muslims in her 
neighbourhood go to any market outside that area. She said: “Yes of course, they go 
to Lajpat Nagar, Saroijni Nagar, and people from outside also come here, but very 
few. Usually it is the other way”. This ‘people from outside’ expression struck me. 
 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
The case of Muslims in India presents us with dynamic subjects who have been 
grappling with several structural predicaments, but have simultaneously made use of 
the democratic settings governing their lives. On a scholarly religious level, the 
Ulama have devised new modes of conceptualizing how to be governed by non-
Muslim rulers and how to adapt to a minority setting. On a pragmatic level, the 
discourse on citizenship and constitutional guarantees dominates intellectual debates 
among Indian Muslims. Throughout talking with several Muslim intellectuals, 
leaders, students and what some might call the ‘common people’, they have all 
emphasized how it is through the multi-party system, the election process, the 
accountability, the spaces given for freedom of expression and opinion, that Muslims 
can debate their own personal affairs as well as their socio-political problems. 
Through the mechanisms offered by democracy, Muslims can manoeuvre and 
negotiate power relations—something, they cannot dream of in the Arab world, they 
usually add.  
 
It is through the democratic framework that Islamic organizations like the 
Jamaati Islami-i-hind (JIH), manifesting a vision for political Islam as a tool for 
governance in India, could exist and make statements as the following: 
                                                        
10
 This is a legal doctrine introduced in the 1990s by two prominent Muslim religious figures, 
Dr. Taha Jabir al- 
Alwani and Dr. Yusuf al-Qaradawi, and mainly targeted at the Muslim communities living in 
North America and Europe. It basically focuses on the social and financial dealings of these 
communities.  
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The JIH also envisages change of leadership in the broadest sense of the term. This 
includes intellectual leadership, social and cultural leadership, and ultimately, 
political leadership—the culmination of the process. The state is conceived as an 
indispensable means for establishing the order envisaged by Islam. A truly Islamic 
state is considered inconceivable unless its affairs are directed by people of clear 
Islamic vision and commitment, and upright character and competence (Jamaati 
Islami-i-hind website).  
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ABSTRACT: 
 
This paper explores the ways in which normative and ‘universal’ 
notions of (good) governance are negotiated and altered while 
applied to a hierarchical social setting in rural India. While taking 
a critical stand against the ‘global’ language of good governance, 
this paper takes up a society-centric bottom-up approach to 
understand e-governance initiatives in Indian villages. The aim is 
to evaluate to what extent these enterprises are shifting the notions 
of governance in a particular cultural setting and how these 
notions can be understood in a general context. The broader 
theme of the paper is to capture the shifting concepts, institutions 
and practices of governance emerging out of a complex interplay 
between structure and agency. Hence the emerging approaches of 
transculturality will shed new light on the politics of governance 
in Asia (particularly India in this case) and bring out new 
concepts to understand the contextual multiplicities involved in 
myriad facets of governance. 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The face of international politics changed drastically as the Cold War came to an end 
in 1990. The bipolarity of international politics made its way towards multi-polar 
world politics. Consequently, the last decade of the twentieth century witnessed a 
renewed interest in democracy, participation, transparency and efficiency (Woods, 
1999). This wider context of political transition coincided with the massive failure of 
‘Structural Adjustment Programmes’ (SAPs) in most of the developing countries. 
Henceforth, the international development community, especially the World Bank 
realized that governance reform is the key to all developmental problems in 
underdeveloped and developing nations. Unlike SAPs which emphasized the role of 
the market as opposed to the state, this new approach towards reform seriously 
considered the role and capacity of the state and institutions (Joseph, 2001). 
Interestingly enough, the governance reform agenda became quietly complementary 
with two related themes of democracy and economic development. Together they 
formed a triad of a magical solution to all the anguish and distress associated with 
underdevelopment. This triad focused on the political system, institutional structures 
and governance processes within a framework of public-private partnership (Santiso, 
2001). All these new developments became popular under the umbrella term of 
‘good governance’. In the last two decades, good governance has become the 
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buzzword of the international development community. The term is packaged in 
such codes of morality that it seems to be devoid of any politics at all. However, 
quite contrarily, in marrying the free market with a strong civil society, good 
governance promises to provide new standards of rule which protect the citizens 
from political societies and undemocratic governments (Corbridge et al., 2005).  
 
Given recent theoretical developments in interdisciplinary research in the 
humanities and social sciences, it could be argued that studies of governance in 
general and ‘good governance’ in particular acquire a sophisticated critical edge in 
the emerging paradigms of transculturality. Studying governance in a transcultural 
context implies examining the multidirectional cultural flows through which 
concepts, institutions and practices of governance are transferred across cultures 
(across all levels of local, regional and global governance) and are reconfigured in a 
continuous but non-linear historical process through webs of asymmetries involved 
in receiving and negotiating such flows
1. Hence, ‘good governance’ can also be 
studied as a flow of concept which has been adopted and transmitted as a universal 
language quite consistently across the globe at all levels of governance institutions 
and practices through negotiating resulting asymmetries. Here asymmetry ceases to 
be a merely analytical category. It brings the focus back to human agency and the 
resulting conflict, which leads to the continuous yet non-linear process of 
transmission eventually culminating in a hybrid form of governance. Transculturality 
therefore provides critical perspectives by rendering itself as a more complex frame 
of analysis which helps surmount the dangers of the ‘normative’ in deepening our 
understanding of good governance (or governance in general). 
 
As the title suggests, the aim of this article is to understand good governance in 
a transcultural context where e-governance will serve as a tool to set the analytical 
framework of such an understanding. Given the task at hand, the paper is structured 
around three broad sections. The first section focuses on the conceptual overview of 
‘good governance’ bringing its contexts and connotations together. The following 
section establishes and explores the relationship between good governance and e-
governance with a focus on the transformation of governance. This is where 
particular e-governance experiences in the Indian context will be discussed. Finally, 
the third section addresses the issues arising from the previous two sections and 
weaves them together in a broader framework of transculturality. 
 
 
II.  GOOD GOVERNANCE: CONTEXTS AND CONNOTATIONS 
 
Governance lies in the complex overlap of state-society interactions (see figure 6; cf. 
also Mitra 2006: 21), which in turn thrive on how authority, resources and power are 
distributed among the public, private and ‘people’ sectors and across various levels 
of government (from the global to the local level) (see figure 7). As explicated in the 
figures below there are three important stakeholders namely public, private and civil 
society. Depending on their respective roles the interaction between state and 
society, and consequently the system of governance also changes. The concept of 
governance rose to prominence in recent times against a backdrop of multiple 
contemporary political and ideological changes which propelled significant changes 
in the way public authority and resources are being allocated and deployed. Hence, 
the usage of the term governance has moved to the centre of an overlapping set of 
                                                        
1
 These views are evoked by writings of members of the Cluster of Excellence Asia and 
Europe in a Global Context: Shifting Asymmetries in Cultural Flows at Heidelberg 
University. Some of the thoughts expressed here are accessible on the website of the Cluster 
(http://www.asia-europe.uni-heidelberg.de).  
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concepts across a broad range of fields and their practitioners (Ramesh and Fritzen, 
2009). In fact, it would not be wrong to say that governance is situated at the 
intersection of multiple agendas, and in turn gives rise to a governance reform 
agenda which is popularized by phrases such as ‘good governance’. 
 
 
Figure 6: State, Society and Governance in the Modern State 
Figure 7: Complex of Governance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
        
 
 
 
As has already been mentioned in the introduction, good governance emerged 
alongside (or as a result of?) a set of other agendas which challenged the prevailing 
ideas on the size of the state, the locus of authority relationships and the way 
government authority is organized. Privatization, decentralization, global 
governance, participatory democracy (democratization), deregulation, public 
administration reform—all these agendas play out simultaneously in the current 
debate on governance and culminate in the popular approach of ‘good governance’ 
(Ramesh and Fritzen, 2009).  
 
There is as such no definition of ‘good governance’. It is rather an ideal-typical 
construct in the Weberian sense, which delineates the parameters of governance 
through certain indicators. The qualifier ‘good’ clearly denotes the higher standards 
of such a formulation and the imperative to achieve them. 
 
The World Bank has identified three distinct aspects of governance which need 
to be emphasized for reform: “i) the form of political regime; ii) the process by 
which authority is exercised in the management of a country’s economic and social 
resources for development; and iii) the capacity of government to design, formulate 
and implement policies and discharge functions” (Bandyopadhyay, 1996: 3109). 
This implies significant changes in the ways power, authority and resources would 
be allocated and aligned with the close link between democracy, economic 
development and good governance. As far as the criteria of good governance are 
concerned, UNESCAP (United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia 
and the Pacific) sets out eight major characteristics: Good governance is 
participatory, consensus-oriented, accountable, transparent, responsive, effective and 
efficient, equitable and inclusive and follows the rule of law (see figure 8). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source Fig. 6: Mitra (2006); Source Fig. 7: Drawn by the author based on Fritzen’s analysis (2009). 
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Figure 8: Five Principles of Good Governance 
 
Five Principles of Good Governance 
The UNDP 
Principles 
UNDP text on which they are based 
1. Legitimacy 
and Voice 
Participation—all men and women should have a voice in 
decision-making, either directly or through legitimate 
intermediate institutions that represent their intention. 
Such broad participation is built on freedom of association and 
speech, as well as capacities to participate constructively. 
Consensus orientation—good governance mediates differing 
interests to reach a broad consensus on what is in the best 
interest of the group and, where possible, on policies and 
procedures. 
2. Direction 
Strategic vision—leaders and the public have a broad and long-
term perspective on good governance and human development, 
along with a sense of what is needed for such development. 
There is also an understanding of the historical, cultural and 
social complexities in which that perspective is grounded. 
3. Performance 
Responsiveness—institutions and processes try to serve all 
stakeholders. 
Effectiveness and efficiency – processes and institutions 
produce results that meet needs while making the best use of 
resources. 
4. Accountability 
Accountability—decision-makers in government, the private 
sector and civil society organizations are accountable to the 
public, as well as to institutional stakeholders. This 
accountability differs, depending on the organizations and 
whether the decision is internal or external. 
Transparency—transparency is built on the free flow of 
information. Processes, institutions and information are 
directly accessible to those concerned with them, and enough 
information is provided to understand and monitor them. 
5. Fairness 
Equity—all men and women have opportunities to improve or 
maintain their well-being. 
Rule of Law—legal frameworks should be fair and enforced 
impartially, particularly the laws on human rights. 
 
 
Now the question arises what this actually means in pragmatic terms, what is 
the shift from mere governance to ‘good’ governance? This new agenda of good 
governance, though based on the premise of early liberal theories puts emphasis on a 
market concept of equality which strives for empowerment of citizens by making 
them economically self-sustaining and enabling them to enter into market 
transactions. The cooperation of private agencies and NGOs are crucial for this 
purpose. Under this new-found concept of equality and active participation of 
different actors, citizens are often viewed as end users or customers whereas the 
government acts as the service provider. Improving the quality of these services and 
reaching out to a wider base of customers with the help of private and non-
Source: Graham, Amos and Plumptre (2003). 
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governmental stakeholders are the central objectives of the governance reform 
projects, and call for a complete overhaul of public administration (Joseph, 2001). 
 
Therefore, as an issue of public policy, good governance has moved not only 
into the agenda of the World Bank but has also become part of the common parlance 
of national governments and local political actors. In short, good governance 
provides a universal recipe with a gradually growing mix of deregulation, 
privatization, civil service reform and decentralization (the associated agendas of 
reform), which are deemed to produce better governability across societies 
(Corbridge et al., 2005).  
 
 
III. TRANSFORMING GOVERNANCE: GOOD GOVERNANCE 
THROUGH E-GOVERNANCE IN INDIA 
 
Throughout the discussion on good governance in the previous section, it becomes 
apparent that governance parameters are shifting across the globe and new strategies 
are being evolved to transform ideas, institutions and practices of governance geared 
towards a universal set of agendas. E-governance falls into such schematics of 
transforming governance towards ‘good governance’.  
 
Governance in practical terms is the societal synthesis of politics, policies and 
programmes, and e-governance is the application of ICT (Information 
Communication Technology) to this very system of governance in order to ensure a 
wider participation and deeper involvement of citizens, private sectors, civil society 
and formal institutions in the decision-making processes (UNESCO, 2005). In other 
words, e-governance is a form of governance which is facilitated by ICT tools in the 
interaction between government and citizen (G2C), government and business (G2B), 
business and citizens (B2C), as well as within the internal government operations 
(G2G) in order to achieve the following objectives (Deva, 2005) (particularly in 
developing countries):  
 
 Improve connections between citizens and government and encourage their 
participation in governance 
 Make government more simple, transparent and efficient 
 Reduce corruption 
 Open up avenues for direct participation of marginalized groups in the 
policy-making process 
 Reduce poverty 
 Enhance democratization and citizen empowerment 
 
Given this initial introduction into e-governance, we now turn to specific 
initiatives of the Indian government which fits into the overall paradigm of ‘good 
governance’. The attempt here is not to draw a gross generalization of the Indian 
context, but to bring forward the significance of particular contexts in analyzing the 
flows of concepts and practices of ‘good governance’ within the scope of 
transculturality. Moreover, a NASSCOM study (2003) shows that e-governance is 
the fastest growing sector of the IT market in India which grew above 18 percent in 
2001-02. There are many core projects both at the national and the regional level 
such as smart card, national ID card, computerization of revenue departments, and 
generic office management systems. Some of the well-known State initiatives have 
been Gyandoot implemented by the Government of Madhya Pradesh, Friends 
implemented by the Government of Kerala, and Bhoomi implemented by the 
Government of Karnataka. However, most of these national and State government 
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projects fail to remain sustainable even after a successful pilot phase. For example, 
one of the secondary sources pointed out that Gyandoot which started with much 
hype has already died down. The level of awareness about services available under 
such projects is very low among the villagers and in addition infrastructure appears 
to be the strongest barrier. There could be multiple reasons for such failures which 
might differ from one project to the other. However, on a generic level it is believed 
that citizens and officials both are equally habituated to the hierarchic, non-
transparent system of governance which has been operating for many decades now. 
Furthermore, there is a considerable gap between citizen’s expectations and 
government’s visions which renders these schemes rather unattractive for villagers. 
Adding to these systemic drawbacks is the often strong resistance from local 
politicians. Many instances from Madhya Pradesh and Andhra Pradesh show that 
villagers have to depend on the middlemen to access information from computers 
installed in Panchayat
2
 offices (Panda, 2007). Even contracts for VLEs (village level 
entrepreneurs who run the IT kiosks) are fraught with corruption embedded in local 
political society and bureaucracy.  
 
These insights based on a review of secondary literature were reiterated by a 
primary field study undertaken in three Indian States from October 2010 to March 
2011. The aim of the field visit was to carry out a case study of the Common 
Services Centres (CSCs) Scheme initiated by the Government of India along with its 
organizational structure (mentioned below). Qualitative semi-structured interviews 
exhausting all three levels of the project implementation in each State were 
conducted. The research is ongoing and hence it would be prudent to refrain from 
sealing any conclusion on the project at this stage. Nevertheless, some general 
observations can be made on the basis of experiences emerging out of the 
preliminary research. 
 
At this point, it becomes imperative to lay out a basic framework of the scheme 
under scrutiny. CSC is the primary physical front-end of the service delivery 
mechanism which forms one of the three pillars of the e-governance infrastructure 
model as envisioned under the National e-governance Plan. The objective is to 
integrate private sector goals with the government’s social objectives through a 
Public Private Partnership model for achieving socio-economic change in rural India 
through the use of ICT (Information Communication Technology).
3
 The aim of the 
CSC Scheme is to establish 100,000 rural kiosks across the country with an equitable 
distribution—one CSC for every six census villages. The CSC Scheme is not just 
about rolling out IT infrastructure, it also acts as an agent of socially inclusive 
community participation and collective action. The implementation of the project 
takes on the structure depicted in figure 9 (DIT: GOI, 2011): 
 
 
 
                                                        
2
 Panchayat, literally, the ‘rule of five’ is the village council. It is the basic administrational 
unit in India.  
3
 CSCs provide both public (G2C) and private (B2C) services to the villagers. The public 
services can be electric bill deposits, revenue services, issuing land record certificates, birth 
and death certificates, income certificates and many more. The availability of public services 
varies from one state to the other depending on the e-readiness of the concerned departments 
and other bureaucratic processes. Private services can range from mobile phone recharge; 
travel reservations to e-learning courses, private insurance etc. and primarily relies on the 
entrepreneurship of the kiosk operators. 
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Figure 9: Project Implementation Structure: Common Services Centres 
(CSCs) 
 
 
Source: Drawn by the author on the basis of information provided on the DIT websites. 
 
The issues of concern in this project remain somewhat similar to those of the 
previous evaluations of different e-governance initiatives in India. They can be 
summarized as follows: 
 
 Inability to connect to wider needs of the rural masses 
 Inertia within the system of administration and bureaucracy 
 Existing avenues of corruption crippling the promises of ICTs 
 Lack of transparency within the system 
 Feeding into the existing power structures rather than transforming them 
 Failure of long-term sustainability without continuous government support 
 No strong role of the civil society 
 
Needless to say, all these issues hint towards the failure to achieve most 
principles of good governance in any substantial way through ICTs so far (at least in 
India in this case). There are certainly some success stories which trigger hope for 
the future. Nevertheless, transforming governance is a daunting task which implies 
fundamental changes in the system and requires much sustained impetus. However, 
the crucial question here is how to fully comprehend the innate implications of e-
governance and how to deal with its counter-productive forces both from the 
theoretical and the pragmatic point of analysis. In doing so, it is absolutely necessary 
to focus on the governance part of e-governance whereas the ‘e’, or the technological 
part, should be the aid to the former. This does not mean to undermine the 
contribution of technology (or ICTs), but to propel technological innovations into the 
right channels to maximize gratification as far as e-governance is concerned. 
 
Therefore, e-governance cannot be seen essentially as an administrative 
innovation facilitated by ICT, but should also be recognized as a social process 
which involves not only change in the mental scope and the ways of 
governmentality, but also in the contested area of social forces shaping the evolution 
of this technocratic innovation. Technical processes defining the contours of e-
governance are embedded in the structures of power which might also become 
reactionary. This is particularly evident in villages where local elites play key roles 
in the implementation of the ICT-based projects and enjoy the greater benefits from 
this public good. “The idea that ICT is inherently a liberating technology, and hence 
e-governance is a new way of transcending inept and inefficient bureaucratic 
systems, which empowers ‘end-users’, appears to be completely inaccurate in the 
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rural societal setting” (Sreekumar, 2008: 86) With this insight, the need for new 
perspectives to address governance issues as matters ensconced in culture, context 
and history becomes even more vital.  
 
 
IV.  GOOD GOVERNANCE IN TRANSCULTURAL CONTEXT:  
EMERGING APPROACH TO GOVERNANCE
4
 
 
The study of governance has predominantly been the domain of political science 
approaches that took their point of departure from a given (Western/European) polity 
and evaluated the effectiveness of other political systems from the vantage point of 
the former. Similar trends were present across most social science disciplines in 
post-war times which were dominated by the ‘universal’ appeal of modernization 
theory in developing countries focusing on economic growth (Rostow, 1960), social 
change (Eisenstadt, 1964), and political development (Huntington, 1968) for a linear 
progress of societies along an axis that impeccably connected traditional societies to 
the stage of self-sustaining, liberal, democratic modernity. The post-Second World 
War policy of developmental aid was intended to promote this very idea of 
modernization and somewhat continues to maintain the undercurrents of the same 
philosophy till date. 
 
The agenda of good governance with its components (democratization, 
decentralization, privatizations etc.) reflects a similar tendency of universalizing a 
global language of governance across culture intended to produce predictable, linear 
models of transformation. Moreover, the prefix ‘good’ not only points towards an 
inherent superiority of liberal democratic ideologies which are dominant in the 
international development community, but also denotes the blurred lines between 
ideologies and operational categories. What it ignores is the fact that multi-
directional cultural flows often create conflict and asymmetries in the receiving 
cultures which lie at the heart of any process of change and transformation. The 
emerging perspectives of transculturality could shed new light on the politics of 
governance while attempting to understand the contextual multiplicities involved in 
the processes of governance by deploying notions of asymmetry and hybridity (see 
figure 10). 
 
Asymmetries which surface out of cultural entanglements are not just an 
analytical category, but are one of the driving forces of human agency and 
interaction. The agency of the members of the receiving society plays an active role 
in shaping asymmetrical cultural contacts, selective reception of or even resistance to 
foreign goods, ideas, institutions and practices (Bhabha, 1994). Therefore, in 
analyzing the universal package of good governance, asymmetry does not only serve 
as a heuristic tool but also hints at the human agency and consequent conflict 
involved in the adaptation of good governance in a particular cultural context (India, 
in this case) which is already fraught with innate structures of asymmetry. Thus, 
asymmetry plays itself out at the levels of ideation and implementation.  
 
 
 
 
                                                        
4
 Most of the views in this section have emerged out of the ongoing research and academic 
debate taking place at the Cluster of Excellence ‘Asia and Europe in Global Context’ at 
Heidelberg University. I owe my thoughts expressed and concepts used in this section to my 
supervisor Professor Subrata Mitra, Cluster professors and to my colleagues in the Cluster 
and the South Asia Institute at Heidelberg University. 
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Figure 10: (Good) Governance: A Transcultural Framework 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Multi-directional and asymmetrical cultural links that shove interaction of 
indigenous values and institutions with imported norms and institutional practices, 
lead, occasionally, to a smooth fusion in the form of a stable, legitimate political 
order, but more often than not to disorder and conflict resulting from the rupture 
between the modern state and the traditional society. Real politics of developing 
societies often reveal complex political structures that salvage their indigenous 
traditions and combine them with the cultural flow from outside, originating, 
particularly, in Europe. This leads to the notion of hybridity which not only creates 
buoyancy for new political structures but also tackles the process of serrated 
negotiations involved in such creations. Hybridity therefore serves as a heuristic tool 
to introspect universal political ideas, such as good governance as applied to a 
particular political context (India, for instance) and the resultant counter-productive 
forces. This enables us to understand hybridity also as a dynamic process where the 
universal is combined with the specific to produce a ‘third space’ (Bhabha, 1994). 
 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
In order to understand the shifting facets of governance in Asia, it is important to 
understand the role of history, tradition and cultural complexities of a particular 
region. The aim should be to link these regional experiences with the theoretical 
understanding of governance as such, rather than building universal models and 
assessing the performance of states accordingly. Good governance and its close ally 
e-governance (as experienced in India) show us the pitfalls of such a grand attempt 
by emphasizing the hiatus it creates between the governed and those who govern. 
However, instead of simply negating the grand narrative, the case study of CSCs 
         . Source: Drawn by the author 
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strives to illustrate how universal models of governance are negotiated in the local 
context and create new forms of governance which are neither ‘global’ nor ‘local’. 
These new forms of governance contain the marks of asymmetries, conflict and 
rupture that result from the process of transformation. Therefore, the impact of e-
governance or CSCs (in particular) in rural India point out the continuous interplay 
of structure (state initiative of e-governance) and agency (of different stakeholders 
and actors involved in the process), as well as new hybrid forms of governance that 
emerge out of such interactions (as explicated in Figure 10).  
 
No doubt, parameters of governance are changing across the globe, but the 
process is neither smooth nor homogenous, often obfuscating the notions of 
governance themselves. The emerging paradigms of transculturality bring these 
problematic zones into the frontline of the academic debate. By manoeuvring the 
nebulous zones of contexts and conflicts, possibilities are created to move beyond 
the grand narratives (of European origin), where area studies can merge with 
theories. Hence, rather than engaging in the universal quest for holistic models, 
transculturality compels us to understand how multidirectional flows of ideas, 
institutions and practices of governance create ruptures in a particular cultural 
context without subverting them as mere exotic aberrations. 
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ABSTRACT: 
 
This paper explores how the notion that a nation-state needs to 
advertise itself to foreign publics has developed in China, and how 
the institutional structures responsible for what is known in China 
as ‘external propaganda’ have changed since the founding of the 
People’s Republic of China. In doing so, this study views Chinese 
external propaganda not as an isolated Chinese phenomenon, but 
as a concept that entered China from the ‘West’ in the early 
twentieth century and that has developed by drawing on the 
experience of different countries during different periods. Since 
the beginning of China’s economic opening in 1978, the ability to 
influence foreign publics has become a part of its overall 
development strategy, and the country has started to look 
increasingly to the ‘West’ again as the main model to reform its 
external propaganda. In addition, the continually-developing 
discourse on external propaganda in other countries frequently 
adds new concepts and practices to the Chinese context. This 
paper concludes that changes as to which country served as the 
main model for China have caused some problems, and that 
despite efforts to improve the structure of the external propaganda 
sector, some old issues remain while new challenges emerge. 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Over the last few years, China has invested considerable resources to expand the 
reach of its global media and has launched a plethora of new cultural exchange 
initiatives (most famously the Confucius Institutes) to boost its ‘soft power.’ With 
this large number of new developments, China has been struggling to find an 
adequate bureaucratic structure to coordinate this rapid expansion. At the 2009 
Annual Session of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference 
(CPPCC)
1
, one of the delegates reportedly recommended that China establish an 
institutional structure to coordinate its ‘public diplomacy’ (‘Chen Haosu weiyuan’, 
2009: 9), an indication that the current organizational arrangement is perceived as 
                                                        
1
 The CPPCC is an advisory body consisting of delegates from political parties (known as the 
‘democratic parties’) other than the Communist Party of China, which are allowed some 
participation in the policy process through this channel, but cannot replace the CPC as ruling 
party of China. The CPPCC is in session once a year, around the same time that the National 
People’s Congress (which is nominally the legislative body of the Chinese government) holds 
its annual meeting in March.  
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inadequate. ‘Public diplomacy,’ broadly defined as the attempt of a government to 
influence foreign publics, either directly or through the involvement of third parties, 
in order to make them more amenable to its policies, indeed poses a problem to the 
Chinese bureaucracy that has not yet found a suitable mechanism to co-ordinate 
policy making and implementation for the growing number of activities that in 
official circles are still mostly subsumed under the term ‘external propaganda.’  
 
The goal of this paper is to provide a diachronic institutional analysis of the 
main actors and of the authority structure in the Chinese external propaganda sector 
as it has been adapting to new realities and tried to integrate new concepts and 
practices associated with external propaganda. These are often based on or at least 
inspired by models and discourses from other countries. Despite this link, Chinese 
external propaganda is, with some exceptions, often viewed in isolation of similar 
developments in other countries, especially ‘Western’ ones2.To counter this trend, 
this study explicitly treats Chinese external propaganda as a ‘transnational’ concept. 
At the same time, it acknowledges that the existing (though, of course, not static) 
structural context in China shapes the way in which external propaganda can be 
developed and implemented. This study thus tries to answer the question: what is the 
historical and institutional baggage China has to deal with while reforming ‘external 
propaganda’ and reshaping it in accordance with new developments that have 
emerged in the ‘West,’ which currently serves both as the model and primary 
counter-text for China? 
 
The concept of ‘external propaganda’ as it is understood in China will first be 
explained briefly, demonstrating that it has not only been shaped profoundly by 
‘Western’ debates following World War I, but has, in more recent times, also been 
influenced by current developments in the ‘West,’ most importantly by the post-9/11 
American debate on ‘public diplomacy.’ Second, I will analyze the institutional set-
up of the external propaganda bureaucracy by tracing its history (which, compared to 
the history of other bureaucracies, has undergone a tremendous amount of re-
arrangement) and will identify some of the past and current problems in the structure 
that explain why there has been a sizeable amount of reform, why problems still 
persist, and which new issues have emerged. This paper finds that an inadequate 
institutional structure at the beginning of China’s economic reform period combined 
with the change from the Soviet Union to the ‘West’ as the main model has rendered 
establishing an efficient and independent external propaganda structure difficult.  
 
 
II. THE CHINESE CONCEPT OF ‘EXTERNAL PROPAGANDA’ 
 
While most people probably would not dispute that trying to influence foreign 
publics in one’s favour is not an exclusively Chinese practice, it is often treated as 
such in academic studies;
3
 even explicitly comparative studies are rare
4
. This part is 
dedicated to demonstrating that ‘external propaganda’ is a transnational concept that 
                                                        
2
 The term ‘West’ and the adjective ‘Western’ are used throughout this paper because ‘the 
West’ is an important category in all Chinese writing on external propaganda and the 
international situation in general. It mostly refers to the ‘economic’ West—that is North 
America, Western Europe, and Japan, with the United States as the leading country, exerting 
considerable influence over the other Western countries. 
3
 This probably has as much to do with academic convention as with the fact that the study of 
other countries’ foreign propaganda apparatuses has grown out of and feeds back into 
intelligence work. 
4
 Comparison, if any, is usually implicit and takes place in the form of edited volumes with 
different authors covering separate areas (see, for example, Snow and Taylor, 2009). 
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has been and, more importantly, continues to be influenced by developments in other 
countries. The adjective ‘transnational’ is used here to refer to ‘things’5 (concepts, 
institutions, practices, etc.) associated in particular with the nation-state or the 
nation-state-based world order which are spread across various nation-states and 
which often continue to be in contact with one another, although such continued 
interaction is not necessarily acknowledged. A transnational ‘thing’ is usually some 
form of abstract category or idea that has particular manifestations in various nation-
states that differ from each other with regard to some of its properties. For things not 
directly associated with the nation-state based world order, the term ‘transcultural’ is 
preferred; however, ‘external propaganda’ is referred to as a ‘transnational’ (rather 
than a ‘transcultural’) concept because the very idea of targeting foreign publics is 
closely tied to the nation-state based world order.  
 
Since the notion of the ‘public’ has gained importance in the political 
imaginary, political and other elites have sought ways to be able to manipulate them, 
both on the national and, especially since the two world wars, also on the 
international level. As Peter Kenez has stated, propaganda has been “an integral part 
of modernity” (Kenez, 1985: 4). Whereas the concept of propaganda targeting 
domestic audiences has been challenged in a large number of countries, at least in 
the political realm, and when organized by national governments rather than 
particular interest groups, the notion that a nation-state must advertise itself to 
foreigners in order to be successful has faced far less scrutiny, and continues to be 
accepted even in places where the term ‘propaganda’ itself has clearly come out of 
fashion.  
 
Although some of the activities undertaken by various Chinese imperial courts 
during pre-modern times have been interpreted as forms of ‘external propaganda’ in 
the broader sense, the modern concept with its underlying assumptions about the role 
of publics and a specific set of practices only entered China after the new nation-
state based way of viewing the world had gradually established itself in the country 
during the second half of the nineteenth and the early twentieth century. As early as 
1908, the New York Times reported that an English language publication had been 
launched in Beijing under the direction of military general Yuan Shikai袁世凱 
(1859-1916), which was portrayed as the official mouthpiece of the Chinese imperial 
court and declared to be published with the goal “to express in the press the feeling 
of China with regard to her international situation” (‘National Paper for China’, 
1908). Hence, the idea that China should publicize its official stance to the global 
public already took hold during the last years of the Qing Dynasty (1644-1912), 
before the founding of the Republic and probably even before the Chinese term for 
propaganda in its modern sense had properly established itself.  
 
During the Republican Period (1912-1949), propaganda aimed at foreign 
audiences was most frequently referred to as guoji xuanchuan 國際宣傳 – 
international propaganda. Since the founding of the People's Republic of China 
(PRC) in 1949, duiwai xuanchuan 對外宣傳 has become the more commonly used 
term. Duiwai means “aimed at the outside” and can potentially refer to anyone 
outside a given group, but, in the compound duiwai xuanchuan, is most frequently 
                                                        
5
 ‘Thing’ is used here as the most general to subsume the broad range of different categories 
of occurrences, such as objects, entities, practices, concepts, events, etc. Use of the term is 
based on the Chinese word shiwu事物, object, in (Chinese) Marxist philosophy, which 
encompasses all concrete and abstract things and events that the world is made of.  
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used to refer to propaganda targeted at non-PRC nationals.
6
 The lexeme xuanchuan, 
propaganda, in its modern sense, is believed to have been coined in Japan 
(宣伝Japanese pronunciation: senden), from where it was transmitted to China (cf. 
Volland, 2003: 31). Use of the term xuanchuan in the sense of ‘political 
propaganda,’ including at the international level, can be traced back to the early 
1920s (e.g. Miao 1922).
7
 Many authors have stressed the positive connotation of the 
word compared to ‘propaganda’, which has acquired a profoundly negative 
connotation (e.g. Shen, 1998: 15; Gan, 2004: 10; Volz, 2011: 174)
8
. In fact, the term 
xuanchuan today is used in a similar fashion as ‘propaganda’ was used in early 
twentieth century Europe, i.e. it is neutral: It can refer both to one’s own activities 
and to those of one’s opponent; whether it is ‘good’ or ‘bad’ depends on who 
exercises it. 
 
Despite some earlier attempts to influence foreign publics and buttress China’s 
standing in the world, the idea of propaganda aimed at foreign or international 
audiences gained significantly in popularity in the course of the escalating conflict 
with Japan (Volz, 2011: 163). During the 1930s, largely American-trained 
intellectuals introduced ‘Western’ propaganda theory at Chinese universities and 
through a number of journals (Volz, 2011: 165). While the debate on propaganda 
based on ‘Western’ theories was largely led by people associated with the 
Nationalist Party (Guomindang國民黨, GMD), members of the Communist Party of 
China (CPC) were also exposed to ‘Western’ propaganda theories and practices 
during the Second United Front (1937 to 1946), when the GMD and CPC officially 
co-operated to fight the Japanese, a union which ended with the outbreak of a civil 
war between the two parties after the end of the Second World War. During this 
time, propaganda was viewed by some in the ‘West’ as a ‘magical weapon’ that 
needed to be explored further and as a threat to democracy by others (Bussemer, 
2008: 52). Notably, although the majority of Chinese texts on propaganda viewed it 
positively, more skeptical points of view regarding propaganda in general were also 
represented in the overall debate (e.g. Pan, 1946 [1940]), meaning that a fairly large 
range of ‘Western’ propaganda debates found their way to China. 
 
After the CPC had defeated the GMD and the PRC was established in 1949, 
xuanchuan began to be employed in predominantly positive terms because it was 
mostly used to refer to the activities of the CPC, which, under Soviet influence, 
started building a ‘propaganda net’ (xuanchuanwang 宣傳網) in 1951 to penetrate 
all segments of society (Brady, 2008: 12). During the Mao Period (1949-1976), 
Western works and press clippings continued to be translated and circulated 
internally at various different levels of access; however, I have not located any 
internally published translated Western works on propaganda theory or practice from 
                                                        
6
 Interestingly, duiwai xuanchuan often also encompasses external propaganda aimed at 
residents of territories nominally under PRC control, but de facto run by independent or 
semi-independent regimes, namely Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macao.  
7
 This conclusion is based on searches in two databases of journals from the period, Quanguo 
baokan suoyin and Dacheng laojiu kan quanwen shujuku. There may have been sporadic 
incidents in which the term was used in the sense of political propaganda before the 1920s, 
but I have not been able to locate any examples.  
8
 Awareness of the difference in connotation is also the reason why the English name of the 
Zhonggong zhongyang xuanchuan bu中共中央宣傳部, which I translate as ‘Central 
Propaganda Department’ throughout this paper, has officially been translated as Central 
Publicity Department since 1998 (Shen, 1998: 15). 
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this period
9
. Although China did not copy the Soviet propaganda concept and 
institutions on a one-to-one basis (Volland, 2003) the Soviet influence over Chinese 
practices in the realm of propaganda work and cultural exchange (e.g. ‘friendship 
associations’) can hardly be overstated.  
 
Necessitated by China’s economic reforms and its gradual re-integration into 
the global economy after 1978, it was mainly in the post-Mao period that for the first 
time since the founding of the PRC, external propaganda became the subject of an 
open and widespread discussion in both the realms of politics and academia. With 
increasing exposure to the rest of the world, the CPC was forced to operate in a new 
global environment that it did not control and in which it felt threatened by 
asymmetries both in hard power and in normative power vis-à-vis the ‘West.’ The 
sentiment of being encircled by hostile forces was aggravated after the crackdown on 
the Tiananmen Movement in 1989, which severely tainted China’s image. This was 
followed by the disintegration of the Soviet Union, which left China as the only large 
country in the Socialist camp. Although it is seen as China’s principal opponent in 
the battle over public opinion, ‘the West’ has also—again—served prominently as a 
model for reforming China’s external propaganda. While all cultures absorb 
elements of other cultures, the Chinese case is special in that the Communist Party of 
China openly and professedly engages in this absorption. According to the CPC’s 
vision of China’s development, care needs to be taken to avoid ‘decadent’ Western 
thought entering China during the process of opening up to the outside world, but the 
absorption of progressive technology, thought and other ‘experiences’ is 
encouraged
10
. Hence, as far as external propaganda is concerned, it is often stressed 
that although China’s motives for propaganda are different from those of the United 
States or the ‘West,’11 China can still learn a lot from Western techniques (cf. Li and 
Liu, 2004: 19).  
 
One well-known example of a new idea that emanated from the ‘Western’ 
discourse and has been integrated into the Chinese one is the concept of ‘soft power’ 
(cf. Wang and Lu, 2008; Li, 2008), which was even mentioned by Party Secretary 
and President Hu Jintao胡錦濤 during his work report at the 17th Party Congress in 
2007
12
. This is fairly remarkable as, in general, the Chinese leadership has retained 
the vocabulary of the Mao period instead of adapting new, more ‘fashionable’ terms, 
such as ‘publicity’ and ‘public diplomacy,’ which may enter the academic discourse 
in China, but are usually kept out of official Chinese Party and government 
documents.  
 
Another, perhaps less well-known and unacknowledged ‘flow’ is the overall 
broadening of the concept of ‘external propaganda’ in the early 2000s, which quite 
probably happened in response to the renewed debate on public diplomacy in the 
United States after 9/11. In 1999, Jiang Zemin江澤民, the then-Party Secretary of 
                                                        
9
 Overall, while volumes outlining the experience of local propaganda cadres were circulated, 
not much theoretical writing on either domestic or external propaganda was produced during 
that period. 
10
 This idea is consistent with the ‘Law of the Negation of the Negation’ in the overall 
Marxist world view, in which new historical stages maintain the progressive aspects of the 
previous stages while discarding their backwards elements. 
11
 China’s motives are ‘pure’, while the West’s motive is to ‘Westernize’ and ‘split’ China in 
order to be able to exert ideological hegemony over the entire world (cf. Hu, 2012). 
12
 The National Congress of the CPC is held every five years, usually in autumn. Nominally, 
it is the highest decision making body of the Party. Although decisions are made beforehand, 
they are often introduced to the public around the time that the Party Congress meets. It is 
also when the Party Congress is in session that leadership transitions take place.  
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the CPC and President of China, delivered an important speech on external 
propaganda. The focus of the speech was on traditional media and on improving 
China’s image (cf. Xu, 1999: 2). In contrast, by 2003, the scope of what was 
subsumed under the term duiwai xuanchuan had become considerably larger and 
more congruent with what is discussed in the U.S. under the term ‘public 
diplomacy.’ Given the fact that various Chinese media organizations and think tanks 
closely monitor U.S. academic trends and debates in the media, it is certainly no 
exaggeration to say that without the tremendous post-9/11 concern about public 
diplomacy in the U.S. (cf. Cowan and Cull, 2008: 6), the Chinese discussion on 
external propaganda would not have taken the direction it has. In 2003, the Politburo 
Standing Committee (PBSC)
13
 member in charge of propaganda work, Li 
Changchun, stressed that China must broaden the field and channels of external 
propaganda. The message that Li Changchun sent was for propaganda cadres to 
think outside the box and use any channel possible to propagate China abroad. China 
should strengthen its cultural exchanges and, more importantly, link the fields of 
external propaganda and cultural exchange (cf. ‘Li Changchun zai quanguo waixuan 
huiyi shang qiangdiao’, 2003: 1). This was the first time in the post-Mao period that 
cultural propaganda appeared in such a prominent place. This broader set of 
practices has also been referred to as the ‘big external propaganda pattern’ (da 
waixuan geju 大外宣格局) to distinguish it from the narrower, media-based 
approach to external propaganda
14
. This strongly suggests that current Western 
debates continue to influence the direction of the Chinese debate, including in cases 
where this is not immediately apparent or openly acknowledged.  
 
In sum, the Chinese concepts of ‘propaganda’ and ‘external propaganda’ were 
influenced by both the ‘West’ and the Soviet Union during the Republican Period 
(1912-1949), were then strongly influenced by the propaganda concept and practices 
used in the Socialist camp during most of the Mao period, and have again since the 
1980s, and increasingly so since the 1990s, been strongly shaped by ‘Western’ 
discourses and practices, albeit against the background of a bureaucracy that had 
heavily borrowed from the Soviet Union in terms of delineation of different fields of 
work and concrete work practices.  
 
 
III.  THE EXTERNAL PROPAGANDA BUREAUCRACY 
 
In early 2012, Joseph Nye, father of the concept of ‘soft power,’ commented on the 
supposed ineffectiveness of China’s external propaganda: “What China seems not to 
appreciate is that using culture and narrative to create soft power is not easy when 
they are inconsistent with domestic realities” (Nye, 2012). This may or may not be 
true, however, by analyzing how the bureaucracy has developed and by identifying 
structural problems, the purpose of this section is to show that there are also a 
number of institutional reasons that complicate the policy process in China’s external 
propaganda sector.  
 
                                                        
13
 The PBSC is the de facto decision making body of the CPC, consisting of the top leaders of 
the Party. It currently has nine members.  
14
 Da waixuan geju is a phrase that was first discussed in 1998 in an article by Zheng Peimin, 
which was re-published in 2003. The slogan was the main topic of debate at the national 
conference on external propaganda in 2005. 
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The external propaganda system remains one of the least-studied sectors in the 
Chinese party-state
15
, although in terms of its development, it is perhaps one of the 
most eventful ones. While a lot of information on the inner workings and set-up of 
the external propaganda bureaucracy are not openly available, there is enough 
material to trace the overall development and direction. It is argued here that the fact 
that the CPC has lacked a centralized structure to coordinate external propaganda 
throughout most of its history is an important reason for why the external 
propaganda bureaucracy has seen a lot of adjustment and re-arrangement, both 
during the Mao period and since the beginning of the policies of reform and opening. 
The lack of a strong centralized structure coupled with a number of practices adapted 
on the basis of the Soviet model in previous decades and in place till date, but no 
longer practical for China’s interaction with the rest of the world, pose a problem for 
the external propaganda bureaucracy, which would like to incorporate new concepts 
and practices and adapt to a changed global environment while maintaining an 
efficient and unified bureaucratic structure. 
 
After the founding of the PRC, the CPC instituted a strong domestic propaganda 
apparatus, but did not install a comparably unified and operational external 
propaganda bureaucracy. One likely reason why it did not do so is that the Soviet 
Union, which served as a model before the founding and for the first few years of the 
PRC, did not have any such structure either (cf. Pechatnov, 2001: 7). As was the case 
in China later, the responsibilities of the external propaganda sector in the Soviet 
Union were spread out across units that were supervised by two different super-
ordinate bodies, neither of which had specialized personnel for external propaganda 
(cf. Pechatnov, 2001: 7). By contrast, the GMD had erected a Central Propaganda 
Department in 1923 under the influence of Soviet advisors (cf. Tang, 2005: 63), and, 
after the outbreak of open hostilities with Japan in 1937, established an additional 
unified structure in charge of external propaganda under (informal) U.S. influence 
(cf. Volz, 2011: 169). When the CPC established itself as the ruling party of China in 
1949, the structures engaged in external propaganda and liaising with foreigners 
were not under centralized control and could still be broadly subsumed under two 
categories of different origin: first, there were media units which had been founded 
during the Second World War and which had nominally operated under the guidance 
of Zhou Enlai 周恩來 (1898-1976)16, who became Prime Minister after the founding 
of the PRC. Some of these units had been established with the help of Westerners 
and had focused on getting Western support throughout the Second World War as 
well as during the ensuing civil war with the GMD. A lot of the personnel that had 
worked for these media gained important positions in external propaganda journals 
and external propaganda units of the PRC
17
. These media were, however, gradually 
brought under the control of the CPC propaganda apparatus, which stressed heavy 
control by the Party and the top leadership, who often read and approved of 
important articles personally (cf. Cui, 1988). Second, there were units that had been 
born out of an interaction with the Communist International and the Soviet Union. 
These units were reorganized after the founding of the PRC, resulting, for instance, 
in the ‘International Liaison Department,’ which was founded in 1951 and the 
‘External Cultural Liaison Bureau,’ founded in 1954. In all types of units, a lot of 
                                                        
15
 Brief descriptions of China’s external propaganda system can be found in Brady (2008: 23-
24; 156), and Shambaugh (2007: 47-50). However, the specifics of the bureaucratic 
rearrangement in the post-Mao period are not addressed in detail, and some of the details in 
the secondary literature contradict the information found in Chinese texts. 
16
 Zhou Enlai’s influence over these media units during the war might also be a teleological 
construct created in hindsight by CPC historiography. 
17
 The newly-founded People's China (English edition: 1950—1958) is thus considered a 
successor of the journal China Digest (Zhongguo wenzhai 中國文摘) [cf. Gan, 2004: 148]. 
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Soviet practices were absorbed during the early years of the PRC, but as opposed to 
other sectors in which China selectively adapted the Soviet model, no unified 
structure was placed on top to coordinate all work. 
 
According to the organizational logic of the Chinese bureaucracy, which divides 
party and government work into functionally related sectors, external propaganda 
was not considered a category in its own right, and units involved consequently 
belonged to different functional bureaucracies. The programmatic statement that 
external propaganda forms an important part of both propaganda work and foreign 
affairs continues to be stressed in most speeches by China’s leaders (e.g. ‘Rang shijie 
liaojie Zhongguo’, 1998: 2) and means that policy making is, like in the Soviet 
Union, spread out across two different systems (xitong 系统) formally handled 
separately in the policy process. At the very top, during the Mao period, external 
propaganda was the joint responsibility of the ‘Foreign Affairs Leading Small 
Group’ (FALSG) and the ‘Propaganda and Education Leading Small Group’ 
(Shambaugh, 2007: 47). Leading small groups were initially intended to strengthen 
party control over government work, but have become de facto decision-making 
bodies for the inner circle of the CPC leadership in the post-Mao period (Shaw, 
2010: 6-8). They are usually comprised of cadres from pertinent party and state units 
in the sector that they are responsible for and are intended to facilitate coordination 
and avoid conflict by providing a platform for cooperation during the stage of policy 
formulation (cf. Shaw, 2010: 6-8).  
 
Some reforms of the external propaganda sector already took place during the 
Mao period. A major change in policy coordination occurred in 1958, when the 
responsibilities within the external propaganda sector were reshuffled after the 
introduction of leading small groups into the system. Before 1958, media-related 
external propaganda had been the responsibility of the ‘International Liaison 
Department,’ while propagating China’s foreign policies was the responsibility of 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (‘Zhonggong zhongyang pizhuan’, 1994 [1958]: 
371). With the creation of the FALSG, the role of the International Liaison 
Department was thoroughly curtailed, and most major responsibilities were handed 
over to the new Leading Small Group, including macro-level policy making, with an 
elaborate division of labour for specific tasks between a number of other units 
belonging to different functional bureaucracies (cf. ‘Zhonggong zhongyang pizhuan’ 
1994 [1958]: 372-373). 
 
It is not true, as most Chinese academic literature claims (e.g. Gan 2004, 196-
205), that the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976)
18
 crippled all external propaganda 
work. Activities were by and large expanded rather than curtailed as China came to 
view itself as the new ‘centre of the world revolution’ and felt a new urge to export 
Mao Zedong’s ideological discoveries to the rest of the world. However, during the 
initial years of the Cultural Revolution, almost all cadres involved in external 
propaganda under Zhou Enlai were purged, and the organizational structure was 
dissolved and rearranged (cf. ‘Zhongguo gongchandang zuzhishi ziliao bianshen 
weiyuanhui’, 2000, vol. 6: 68-69). In January 1978, briefly after its re-establishment 
in late 1977, the Central Propaganda Department (CPD)
19
 added a ‘Bureau for 
External Propaganda’ to its internal structure (‘Zhongguo gongchandang zuzhishi 
                                                        
18
 The Cultural Revolution was a political movement initiated by Mao Zedong in 1966. 
During this period, many high-level CPC leaders were purged, intellectuals persecuted, and 
the regular operation of institutions, such as schools and universities disrupted. The high tide 
of the Cultural Revolution lasted from 1966 to 1969. 
19
 The CPD in China is responsible for media work (newspapers, journals, radio, television, 
etc.), theory and thought work, as well as culture (cf. Brady, 2008: 11; 21).  
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ziliao bianshen weiyuanhui’, 2000, vol. 7: 230). In 1980, in addition, the ‘External 
Propaganda Small Group’ (Duiwai xuanchuan xiaozu對外宣傳小組, EPSG) was 
founded. This was not a leading small group, meaning that its status in the overall 
bureaucracy was lower, but it served a similar function by combining cadres from 
various units involved in external propaganda as well as in foreign affairs work. It 
was headed by the CPD’s de facto director, and its executive body remained the 
Bureau for External Propaganda at the CPD. The Small Group was comprised of 
cadres from fourteen different units that combined players from the propaganda 
system,
20
 the foreign affairs system, as well as the bureaucracies in charge of 
Taiwan, Hong Kong, Macao, and overseas Chinese affairs work (‘Zhonggong 
zhongyang guanyu jianli duiwai xuanchuan xiaozu’ 1994 [1980]: 386). In 1988, the 
EPSG was disbanded as part of the central streamlining in that year (Brady, 2008: 
156) after a campaign in 1987 had shifted the main concern and focus towards a 
reinforcement of domestic propaganda. The concrete responsibilities of the EPSG 
were officially handed back to the CPD Bureau for External Propaganda, but the 
director and most of the personnel remained the same (Zeng, 2006: 44). In terms of 
decision making at the highest level, two different Leading Small Groups were put in 
charge of external propaganda: the Propaganda and Thought Work Leading Small 
Group (Xuanchuan sixiang gongzuo lingdao xiaozu宣傳思想工作領導小組, 
PTWLSG), which had been created a month before the abolition of the EPSG was 
announced (‘Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu zhongyang xuanchuan sixiang gongzuo 
lingdao xiaozu’, 1994 [1988]: 1703) was made responsible for overall policies, 
whereas the FALSG received the responsibility for external propaganda concerning 
larger issues in the international situation and China’s diplomacy. Concrete 
enforcement of policies was made the responsibility of CPD, while administrative 
matters and allocating the budget was to be handled by the State Council Foreign 
Affairs Office (‘Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu chexiao’, 1994 [1988]: 1704). 
 
In order to counterbalance the negative images of Tiananmen after the CPC had 
crushed the Chinese democracy movement on June 4, 1989, the EPSG was re-
established in 1990. The resurrected EPSG was led by the PTWLSG and had the 
rank equivalent to that of a ministry or a province (‘Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu 
huifu’, 1994 [1990]: 1904). Propaganda pertaining to the overall international 
situation and China’s foreign policy remained in the hands of the FALSG. The re-
establishment of the EPSG entailed turning it into an entity with an office and a staff 
of its own, as opposed to the 1980s, when its office operated from the premises of 
CPD and its authority within the Chinese bureaucracy was uncertain (Zeng, 2006: 3).  
 
Despite the creation of a permanent office in charge of external propaganda, the 
sector was still part of two different systems with responsibilities shared by two 
different LSGs. Both policy making and the institutions involved in policy 
implementation continued to be spread out over different functional areas handled 
separately in the policy process. Moreover, external propaganda was obviously not 
the primary concern in either LSG. For the FALSG, the most important issue is 
national security and territorial integrity, compared to which China’s image in the 
eyes of foreigners inevitably becomes a secondary consideration
21
. Likewise, the 
primary concern of the propaganda field is propaganda aimed at Chinese audiences, 
                                                        
20
 A system, the English translation for xitong系統, refers to a “grouping of functionally 
related bureaucracies” (Lieberthal 1995, 193). 
21
 A prime example of the priority of territorial integrity over China’s image (in this case 
China’s image as a peaceful country) was the passing of the Anti-Secession Law in 2005 
which threatened military action should Taiwan declare Independence.  
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as success or failure in this field has more immediate implications for regime 
security. 
 
In January 1991, the State Council Information Office (SCIO), which is 
presented as a government instead of a Party institution, was set up as a second 
separate entity from the Central Propaganda Department along with the EPSG. From 
the very beginning, EPSG and SCIO were “one organization with two nameplates” 
(‘Zhongguo gongchandang zuzhishi ziliao bianshen weiyuanhui’, 2000, vol. A1: 
897), which means that the State Council Information Office exists only in name. 
Here, the CPC has found an acceptable solution for a conflict between a 
transnationally-established practice (that governments should have a press or 
information office), and the rules according to which the Chinese bureaucracy 
functions, namely that media-related work must remain within the hands of the 
Party. In accordance with international convention, the Chinese government needed 
a press office to speak on its behalf, but the CPC was reluctant to actually vest a 
government bureaucracy with that power. Therefore, the EPSG/SCIO was put under 
the direct authority of the Party Centre (cf. ‘Zhongguo gongchandang zuzhishi ziliao 
bianshen weiyuanhui’, 2000, A1: 896), but acted to the outside world as if it were a 
government agency. In July 1993, according to an official party compilation on the 
organizational structure of the CPC, the EPSG was ‘adjusted’ to become the Office 
of External Propaganda (Zhonggong zhongyang duiwai xuanchuan bangongshi 
中共中央對外宣傳辦公室, OEP) [‘Zhongguo gongchandang zuzhishi ziliao 
bianshen weiyuanhui’ 2000, vol. 7: 243]. However, it is more likely that the Small 
Group, i.e. the structure in which leading cadres come together to deliberate policies, 
was maintained
22
 and that the name ‘Office of External Propaganda’ is simply short 
for ‘Office of the External Propaganda Small Group’ (Duiwai xuanchuan xiaozu 
bangongshi 對外宣傳小組辦公室). 
 
Although the fact that the external propaganda sector was put under the 
authority of the Central Committee may, again, have been another step towards 
granting it some more independence, and combating the situation in which units 
involved were under the leadership of two main and various other LSGs, the 
PTWLSG continued to have some authority over it (cf. ‘Zhongguo gongchandang 
zuzhishi ziliao bianshen weiyuanhui’, 2000, vol. 7: 243)23. In addition, the units 
actually responsible for the external propaganda work were often under the authority 
of (or at least financially dependent on) other units not directly engaged in external 
propaganda work and took orders from the PTWLS, FALSG, or another LSG 
instead. For instance, many external propaganda media units received their funding 
through super-ordinate media units whose main responsibility was to organize 
content aimed at Chinese audiences. This made external propaganda media heavily 
dependent on domestic media and was pointed out as a severe systemic flaw by 
cadres engaged in external propaganda (cf. Xia, 2000: 22). 
 
The overall media system, in which media units have to await instructions 
before reporting on certain sensitive issues and are required to use specific 
formulations is already problematic for domestic reporting; in external propaganda, 
where Chinese media units face even more fierce competition from other global 
                                                        
22
 As explained below, Zhu Muzhi mentioned that the EPSG was ‘upgraded’ to a leading 
small group in the early 2000s. This suggests that the Small Group continued to operate after 
1993.  
23
 The continued division of press conferences into domestic news, handled by OEP/SCIO, 
and international affairs, handled by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which is under the 
authority of the FALSG, suggests that the FALSG, likewise, continues to direct aspects of 
external propaganda work. 
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media, it becomes a severe liability. However, there is no indication that the CPC is 
preparing to relinquish control over the media or de-emphasize propaganda work. 
On the contrary, at the 16
th
 Party Congress in 2002, when Hu Jintao became new 
Party Secretary and President of the PRC, the propaganda sector was elevated in 
terms of its administrative rank in the Party hierarchy as the responsibility for all 
propaganda and thought work was handed over to a member of the PBSC, the 
highest body in the CPC consisting of the nine most powerful cadres. Likewise, at 
some point in time in the early 2000s, presumably after the 16th Party Congress in 
2002, the ‘External Propaganda Small Group’ was upgraded to the status of ‘Leading 
Small Group’, which strengthened the sector (Zhu, 2007: 248). However, it is safe to 
assume that the External Propaganda Leading Small Group (EPLSG) is outranked by 
the PTWLSG and the FALSG, both of which are headed by PBSC members, the 
latter even by the Party Secretary himself.  
 
Additionally, two new structural problems have emerged. First, owing to an 
international environment in which it becomes increasingly difficult to contain 
media or other messages to only one particular target audience, the external 
propaganda sector has again been tied more closely to the domestic propaganda 
apparatus. New media like the internet, which makes material more widely and 
easily available to different groups of people, as well as an increasing number of 
people fluent in foreign languages have blurred the boundaries between internal and 
external propaganda, a point first formally noted by the CPD in 2003 (cf. Brady, 
2008: 13). In 2009, the new head of OEP/SCIO stressed the need to “co-ordinate the 
domestic and the international situation.” This slogan, which applies to a variety of 
fields, was adopted at the 17
th
 Party Congress. In the media sector, it seeks to answer 
the challenging question of how to control both domestic and international public 
opinion in a global environment in which information travels fast and national 
borders are more difficult to control in terms of information flow (cf. Ling, 2007). 
For external propaganda this means that if there is a conflict between vital interests 
of external propaganda and domestic propaganda, domestic propaganda interests will 
win
24
. Institutionally, internal and external propaganda have again been tied together 
more closely: between 1998 and 2008, the director of the Office of External 
Propaganda was not directly linked to the Central Propaganda Department. In 2008, 
former head of the Party mouthpiece People’s Daily (Renmin ribao人民日報), 
Wang Chen 王晨, who was made deputy director of CPD in the same move, was put 
in charge of OEP/SCIO. This seems to indicate that after ten years, the trend and 
goal of granting the OEP/SCIO more independence has been reversed and replaced 
by an arrangement of both supervision and closer co-operation.  
 
Second, although an LSG was finally created, the different bodies involved in 
external propaganda continue to increase with the expansion of the notion of external 
                                                        
24
 For instance, the general rule for Chinese propaganda aimed at foreign audiences is that if 
foreign media report on something, or are likely to report on something that happened in 
China, the Chinese media cannot be silent about it and need to try to report before the foreign 
media. Yet, to give a fairly recent example, during the ‘Jasmine Revolution’ protests in 
various Chinese cities in February and March 2011, the importance not to spread the news 
among Chinese outweighed the importance to report and to report on time, so the Chinese 
foreign language media reported very late, only indirectly and not at all on television about 
this event. I was in Beijing at the time and followed the news of Chinese media outlets, 
including the English language TV channel, CCTV-International. While the ‘Jasmine’ 
protests were generally a non-event, the party-state took a large number of precautions, 
including thoroughly blocking ways to circumvent the ‘Great Firewall’, i.e. the system that 
prevents (politically or otherwise) undesirable content on the internet from being accessed 
through Chinese IP addresses.  
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propaganda (which implies the adaptation of new practices) and the wish of CPC 
leading cadres to exploit every channel to engage in external propaganda. This has 
led to the call mentioned at the beginning of this paper for a coordinating body in 
charge of all work that can be categorized as belonging to the field of ‘public 
diplomacy.’ Chinese authors have been systematically studying and comparing the 
institutional structures behind activities related to ‘public diplomacy’ in various 
Western countries in order to find a suitable model that China could selectively adapt 
(e.g. Liao, 2011 [2009]). This shows some readiness to reform the entire sector 
again, and, perhaps, impose an institutional structure that is more capable of 
expanding and implementing new practices, as the concept of ‘external propaganda’ 
continues to absorb new ideas and practices from abroad. However, what such a new 
arrangement would look like, and whether it would be strengthened vis-à-vis other 
bureaucracies, is currently still unclear. 
 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
The above analysis has shown that after several decades of intense and continued 
reform, the CPC still struggles to find an ideal coordinating mechanism for external 
propaganda work that is efficient without jeopardizing or counteracting the work of 
other sectors that are still considered strategically more important. The current 
institutional structure poses a number of problems. There continues to be a large and 
growing number of organizations that belong to different policy sectors and cannot 
easily be placed under the direct leadership of the EPLSG or the OEP/SCIO. 
Relatedly, some of the shortcomings of ‘external propaganda’ that Chinese analysts 
frequently complain about, such as a reporting style that is not suited to foreign 
tastes or late reports especially in crisis situations, are arguably a direct result of the 
institutional arrangement at the decision and policy-making level, where the interests 
of external propaganda institutions are secondary to domestic concerns. Especially in 
the media sector, however, a more independent external propaganda bureaucracy 
currently seems unlikely.  
 
Moreover, it has been suggested here that the institutional problems are, at least 
in part, the outcome of the back and forth as to whose propaganda concept and 
institutions China should adopt as its principal model. The shift from selective 
adaptations from the Soviet Union to selective adaptations from various ‘Western’ 
countries has caused problems, first, because of the lines of division in the overall 
bureaucratic structure and, second, because of concrete practices, especially in the 
realm of media work, which are incompatible with the requirements posed by the 
new international environment that China is part of. Thus, the study of Chinese 
external propaganda potentially provides an interesting test case to explore the 
question whether and how concepts and institutions originating from vastly different 
ideological universes can be merged and combined within the Chinese party-state. 
As both the scope of external propaganda work and the institutional arrangement are 
likely to undergo more changes in the near future, further investigation into this issue 
is needed.  
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ABSTRACT: 
 
The World Heritage Site, old town of Lijiang, is one of the most 
popular inbound tourism destinations of China, and has attracted 
millions of tourists in the context of a direct encounter with 
Chinese ethnic cultures. To satisfy demands of both the inbound 
and domestic tourism, the commoditization of local cultures and 
its manifestation in the indigenous religion and folk festivals have 
been developed dramatically as a ‘reinvention of tradition’. 
Grounded in the tourism development of Lijiang in the past two 
decades, this paper aims to explore how tourism imaginaries are 
produced, negotiated, and transformed to intersect and establish 
the dynamic network of actors including different individuals and 
groups in the tourism industry of Lijiang. The consciousness of 
cultural flows made by the mutual communication between the 
local community and the tourism is addressed as part of global 
dynamics. In this sense, the mediation between the global and the 
local strengthens a continuity of cultural forms of the past, and 
synthesizes transculturality in different places through reinvention 
and innovation. 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Imaginaries are conceptualized as socially transmitted representational assemblages 
that interact with peoples’ personal imaginings (Salazar, 2012). Tourism imaginaries 
of destinations and travels are increasingly produced and consumed by diverse 
populations around the globe through expanding forms of media and opportunities 
for travel. A range of actors collaboratively produce spatial imaginaries in touristic 
systems. Although there is substantial literature documenting the tourism 
imaginaries, limited research has been devoted to the dynamic imaginaries by the 
flow of different actors in the tourism industry.  
 
World heritage is widely discussed as dynamic and living value systems of 
layered significance, which are central to the individual, community, national and 
global sense of cultural esteem and identities. When world heritage meets tourism, a 
global phenomenon for direct, indirect, physical, and cultural interaction emerges 
wherein heritage has been constructed as a platform for cultural representation and 
social consumption. As a result of commercialization, bar culture in tourism 
destinations often serves the purposes of entertainment, exchanging information, 
making acquaintances and sometimes searching for romance.  
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In the late 1980s and the early 1990s, Lijiang as a historic trade centre started to 
market itself as an international tourism destination. Since then, the town has 
attracted a number of Western tourists from around the world. Western backpackers 
are fascinated by this remote town described as “a magic Kingdom of wealth, scenic 
beauty, marvellous forest, flowers and friendly tribes” (Rock, 1947: viii). After being 
included in the World Heritage List by UNESCO in 1997, Lijiang has become one of 
the most popular destinations for both inbound and domestic tourists in China. The 
local culture becomes eroticized, romanticized and ethnicized through the tourism 
imaginaries collaboratively produced by the local government, the tourism 
practitioners and the local community. Shifting from a historic trade town to a 
commercial heritage site, Lijiang has acquired a new connotation as a ‘town of 
romance’. 
 
Taking the tourism development of Lijiang, especially the transformation of its 
varied images as a case study, this paper aims to explore how tourism imaginaries 
are produced, negotiated, and transformed to intersect and establish the network of 
actors including different individuals and groups in the tourism industry. It 
elaborates the argument by examining how the historic trade town is transformed to 
the commercial heritage site, and how the theme of love is constructed with the 
presentation of romance in the bars. This paper conceptualizes tourism discourse as a 
transcultural process that embodies a mix of both homogenizing and diversifying 
forces. The complex process of the formation of tourism imaginaries needs to be 
understood in terms of the cultural flows and internal shifts of power, which move 
from a binary opposition to an intertwined reality. It also stimulates the theoretical 
understanding of the relational and structural nature of cultural flow in constructing 
imaginaries in tourism. In this research, participant observations and interviews are 
applied as the main research methods.  
 
 
II. TOURISM IMAGINARIES AND THE FLOW OF ACTORS 
 
Imaginaries are regarded as symbolic objects of a significant contest over economic 
supremacy, territorial ownership, and identity (Salazar, 2012). The symbolic order 
structures the visual field of the imaginaries and on the other hand, the imaginaries 
are rooted in the subject's relationship with his or her own body (Lacan, 1964). Like 
Joy and Sherry (2003) state, imagination is “thoroughly embodied” (Joy and Sherry, 
2003: 278). Such imagination is expressed through virtual body enactments, and is 
co-constructed through the interaction of service providers and receivers (Chronis, 
2005).  
 
Concerning the approach of symbolic interaction for studying imaginaries, 
Blumer (1986) argues that humans relate to things on the basis of the meanings. The 
meaning of such things is derived from, or arises out of the social interaction that 
one has with others and the society. These meanings are dealt with, and modified 
through an interpretative process by the person dealing with the things they 
encounter. By this approach, meanings are associated with particular imaginaries 
that are created, negotiated and interpreted. Hence, as the output of social interaction 
with people’s imaginings, imaginaries are used as meaning-making and world-
shaping devices (Salazar, 2012). It is both a function of producing meanings and the 
product of this function (Ricoeur, 1994).  
 
In the process of the formation of imaginaries, the value and meaning of 
symbols and knowledge can be changed and re-interpreted. Empowered by imagined 
vistas of mass-mediated narratives, tourism imaginaries nowadays have become 
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more global and dynamic (Crouch, Jackson and Thompson, 2005). In other words, 
global tourism constructs images and ideas of people and places based on their 
original context, making them available through their transformation, legitimization, 
institutionalization, and distribution (Salazar, 2012). Thus, the way in which 
different forms of symbols are constituted is also dynamic, once the network of 
different actors in tourism is involved. 
 
In this sense, tracing the global circulation in tourism, particularly different 
actors involved in tourism activities offer innovative ways to interpret the 
transformation and evolution of imaginaries. Latour (2005) put forward the actor-
network theory to indicate in what directions images and ideas move, and how they 
circulate and are transformed during circulation. Based on this theory, everything 
circulating within a network is continuously interpreted and modified (Latour, 2005). 
Every single actor can potentially make use of a series of translating or distorting 
processes (Duim, Jóhannesson and Ren, 2012). But the network itself is also part of 
the dynamic ongoing process of structural change by excluding and including 
various actors. 
 
In the global tourism network, tourism imaginaries are produced by local people 
and tourists, as both intermediaries and consumers. Imaginaries are embedded in the 
network of local, national and global actors that determine their way of practices. All 
actors co-exist at a certain point in time, thus forming an emotional connection to 
participate in the battle of the “imagined community” (Anderson 1991), where a 
feeling of communitas is shared among all participants. These participants 
collaborate in space and time and contribute to the construction of the imaginaries. 
The social construction of the imaginaries of a tourism destination becomes a 
process of local meaning-making, continuous stimulation and intervention from 
varied actors passing in and out with social and cultural movements, which give rise 
to the revised imaginaries of this place. 
 
To sum up, the actor-network theory can potentially enrich the description of 
the dynamic construction and production of tourism imaginaries. Through the flow 
of actors in the tourism network, the tourism imaginaries are more than embedded in 
the tourist’s mind and their travel experience. Rather, imaginaries focus on the 
actors’ integration with alternative symbols and meanings and constitute “the flow of 
relations among things, people and human purposes” (Reisinger and Steiner, 2006). 
From a trade town centre to a commercial heritage site with the theme of ‘love and 
romance’, the story of Lijiang presents the dynamic process of producing the 
multiple imaginaries in the global tourism. 
 
 
III. FROM A TRADE TOWN TO A COMMERCIAL HERITAGE SITE 
 
Lijiang County is located in Southwest China, 600 kilometres from the 
provincial capital, Kunming. Among the many ethnic groups living in Lijiang, Naxi
1
 
is the most numerous one accounting for about 60 percent of the total population. 
Naxi living in Lijiang still maintain a number of traditional cultural activities in their 
daily life including their own religion—Dongba. The indigenous religion of the Naxi 
community is influenced by both Tibet and China, including Bon (indigenous, pre-
Buddhist) practices from Tibet, Tibetan Buddhism, Chinese Buddhism, Daoism and 
                                                        
1
 Naxi is the main ethnic group in this region, many of whom live in Lijiang. The other 
members of the group call themselves Mosuo. However, both groups are officially classified 
by the Government as Naxi. 
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Confucianism. These bond Naxi people closely with all important events like birth, 
marriage, and death. The Dongba religion is centred around maintaining harmony 
between humans and nature, and consists of offerings and dances to worship 
ancestors and nature, and to expel evil spirits (McKhann, 1992). 
 
Historically, little intervention and weak control by the central authority has left 
space for local Naxi people to develop their own society for a long time. The town 
became an unparalleled commercial market on its own. Lijiang was an advanced 
industrial town for the leather, textile, copper and iron industry. At the peak of 
commercial development, it is estimated that the town accommodated more than 100 
companies and 1,200 shops from different industries including active family 
business (Lijiang Prefecture Committee for Editing Local Records, 2000). Most of 
the local businessmen inherited their shops through the generations. Senior Naxi can 
draw on many historical images: selling special products on certain bridges; chatting 
and trading in the squares, and celebrating festivals with firework. This wave of 
commercialization, albeit transient and hasty, ostensibly portrayed a grand picture of 
the town’s commercial prosperity in the past. 
 
After the end of the Ming Dynasty in 1644, the emperors were determined to 
incorporate the indigenous groups in peripheral regions into the Han to prevent them 
from acts of rebellion challenging the domination of the empire. As a result, the 
officials brought Han and Confucian practices and thoughts to educate the minority 
groups in Lijiang. This policy, referred to as gaituguiliu has brought dramatic 
changes to the indigenous culture, while enhancing cultural and economic exchange 
in this area. 
 
Business development in the old town of Lijiang continuously stimulated Sino-
Indian trade as an important channel to provide necessities. The trade was carried on 
horseback and its main commodity was tea. This commercial link between Yunnan, 
Tibet and India was known as the ‘Tea Horse Road’. Sifang square in Lijiang was 
the main market and the starting point for caravans on their way to Tibet and India 
(Ebbe and Hankey, 2000). During the era of the Republic of China, the Sino-
Japanese War (1937-1945) blocked all trade routes into China, but gave rise to the 
overland trade in which goods were carried from India to Kunming through Lijiang. 
This brought a sudden expansion of the trade through the town of Lijiang, thus 
contributing to its prominence as a market centre. 
 
The globalization process in Lijiang took place when Western scholars and the 
mass media entered this town at the beginning of the twentieth century. The first 
image of Lijiang was invented by James Hilton’s novel Lost Horizon (1933), as a 
paradise of Shangri-la, where the town was viewed as a romantic forgotten place 
frozen in time (Su and Teo, 2009). Later, Joseph Rock and Peter Goullart, who had 
both successively stayed in Lijiang, published descriptive texts of the town, 
reinforcing the image of China’s peripheral area as an oriental paradise marked by 
tradition and nature. Peter Goullart, the Russian officer who spent eight years in 
Lijiang from 1941 to 1949, recorded it as an ancient forgotten Naxi kingdom of 
Southwest China (Goullart 1957). During the early 1980s, the town was relatively 
closed when Lijiang was almost marginalized as it was far away from the agitated 
centres of reforms occurring in the China’s coastal regions. Many western 
backpackers and Japanese group tourists visited the town and were fascinated by this 
remote area of China. 
 
However, the Shangri-la mythology in Hilton, Rock and Goullart’s dreams and 
imaginaries has dramatically changed due to millions of international and domestic 
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tourists, ever since Lijiang opened to the global tourism market in the late 1990s. 
Lijiang was listed as a World Heritage site in 1997 because of its material landscapes 
depicting its urban fabric and residential buildings, and its vernacular landscape 
constituted by religion and language in the form of pictographic words and music. 
The World Heritage Committee of the UNESCO described the site in the following 
words: 
 
“The Old Town of Lijiang, which is adapted to the uneven topography of this key 
commercial and strategic site, has retained a historic townscape of high quality and 
authenticity. It has an abundance of historic buildings and bridges, a canal system 
several hundred years old that is still functioning. Water is channelled through several 
meandering tributaries, yielding a complex network of water supply. Besides sustaining 
everyday life, this water system also beautifies the cityscape. The alignment of the 
streets to the canals renders Lijiang a unique urban fabric, which contrasts sharply with 
the rigid grid-like layout in many other old cities in the central plain” 
(http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/811).  
 
As mentioned before, the symbol of the landscape, the architecture and the 
water system have been evaluated and highlighted for the criteria of heritage 
nomination, and have also become the most attractive icons of tourism promotion. 
UNESCO and the nomination of the old town of Lijiang as a world heritage site 
brought new actors to the network of the site. Lijiang has become a ‘hot spot’ 
heritage site in China, with frequent population migration and cultural flows. In 
2009, Lijiang attracted 7.6 million visitors with 8.8 billion yuan (approx. 1.4 billion 
US Dollars) in revenue drawn from tourism (Lijiang Bureau of Statistics, 2010). The 
influx of modern tourists has accelerated the production of new cultural and social 
capital, bringing dramatic changes to the place and its culture. By linking capital and 
politics, the process of heritage production has converted the Naxi ethnic culture and 
the town into “a predominantly capitalistically organized place, driven by the 
inherent and defining social dynamics of the system” (Britton, 1991: 475). This 
transformed the meaning and symbol-making procedure of the local ethnic 
community. As a result, the original Western imaginaries of Lijiang as an ‘oriental 
lost kingdom’ transformed into the ethnic, authentic and beautiful remote area of 
China. Nowadays, the former historic image of the trade town has inevitably been 
utilized by the local government to justify the economically-motivated flooding of 
the town with tourism. 
 
During this transformation, the old town has become a popular site of the 
commercialized tourism industry. The limited number of shops, formerly exclusively 
for the inhabitants, have mostly transformed into tourism facilities. In 2002, 69.66 
percent of the shops were solely targeted at tourists, whereas only 19.92 percent 
catered to both tourists and locals (Lijiang Bureau of Statistics, 2010). In the past 
decade, the number of shops and tourism facilities in the old town has dramatically 
increased. Main streets around the town centre like Dongda Street, Xinhua Street, 
Xinyi Street, Wuyi Street and Qiyi Street are full of tourist shops, selling souvenirs, 
dresses, videos, and local food. Most shops’ names start with Dongba, Naxi or 
Mosuo to stress the alleged ethnic component. These shops are eliminating the living 
heritage of the old town. Original inhabitants are moving to the new town and most 
of their original houses are transformed into hostels and souvenirs shops.  
 
Scholars have different opinions on the commercialization of the town. Bao and 
Su (2004) illustrate that the commercialized-constructed tourism leads to a 
homogenization of tourism products in the market. Public facilities for tourism are 
far more than living facilities for local inhabitants. This change destroys the original 
form of the urban living culture. However, a government official argues that the old 
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town of Lijiang used to be a trade town, and the current situation is only a reflection 
of its glorious history. This licenses the government to promote the tourism industry 
with various activities. However, the commercialized-constructed tourism does 
change the urban functions physically and vernacularly. The locals as the original 
owners of the town have left the space to the new inhabitants to develop their 
business. Many new elements that do not originally belong to the town have been 
added during the process of commercialization.  
 
In short, from a historic trade centre to a commercial popular tourism 
destination, the image of Lijiang has been continuously changing due to the flows of 
people. The transition of actors has influenced the symbols, the meaning of culture 
and the imaginaries of the site. These changes have also influenced the life of the 
local community. Particularly, the notion of love in Lijiang has been romanticized 
during the process. 
 
 
IV. FROM LOVE TO ROMANCE 
 
Since successfully listed as a World Heritage site by UNESCO in 1997, tourist 
imaginaries of Lijiang have been changing continuously; among the most attractive 
ones is the theme of love from the ethnic marriage customs. Two ethnic customs of 
Naxi history have been transformed in a new aura of romance by the gaze of the 
tourism industry: firstly, the old custom of committing suicide in the name of love 
(xunqing) and secondly, the ‘walking marriage’ tradition of the Musuo Group. 
 
Committing suicide is a long-time tradition in the Naxi culture which has been 
described in the Naxi ancient narrative poem lubanlurao, which says ‘we have kin 
but we do not want to know them. The heart only has love. The heart only has 
honey’. This reflects the naturalization of youthful male sexuality, which is beyond 
the control of parents and opposed to the practice of parentally arranged kin marriage 
common among the Naxi. The phrase ‘they have kin but do not want to know them’ 
suggests the fact that young people lack interest in their own kin as prospective 
marriage partners, and would rather pursue partners on their own. 
 
Suicides occurred frequently among unmarried young Naxi people. Most cases 
took place in isolated or remote areas far from the victims’ home villages. An 
underlying supposition associated with suicides followed this pattern that the 
victim’s intention was to reach the paradise and reunite with their friends and lovers 
who also killed themselves. Lovers dying together indicated that they shared the 
same notions of the paradise and the eternal reunion. They donned their best clothes 
and fled to remote sites. The notions of rebirth in paradise made them bind their 
bodies together to ensure a collective transmission to paradise. It was not merely for 
a fleeting taste of marriage that couples killed themselves, but for the eternal 
happiness promised in the popular tale of the Jade Dragon Mountain’s third 
kingdom. In the Buddhist discourse, suicide may be reflective of a bond of emotion, 
passion, love or friendship; the hope of the survival of love in paradise is preferable 
to the continuation of suffering in the mundane world (Chao, 1995). 
 
After the Han Chinese Confucian custom of betrothal was brought to Naxi 
people with strict sexual repression and baoban marriage
2
 around 1723, young Naxi 
lovers showed a strong tendency to fight for their free love relationship, which made 
the tradition of xunqing more popular. The adoption of the Han Chinese customs of 
                                                        
2
 The term refers to a form of marriage that is arranged by the parents of the couple.  
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marriage and morality directly resulted in indigenous schemes of romantic courtship 
and, in some cases, premarital sexual activities. Practitioners of love suicides were 
aware of the legitimizing effects of marriage and thus constituted suicides in their 
likeness (Chao, 1995). In Mao’s era, the local government has implemented many 
measures to prevent young couples from committing suicide. Although fewer cases 
occurred than before, the image of young couples fighting against the society by 
suicides and dreaming of their freedom in paradise has been propagated by the mass 
media in the context of the tourism promotion.  
 
In 2003, a TV series entitled ‘One Meter Sunshine’ was filmed in Lijiang. In 
this drama, Lijiang was projected as a land of sacred love where the lead actress 
chose to commit suicide on the Jade Dragon Snow Mountain. This TV drama was 
hugely successful on a national scale, and Lijiang started to be viewed as the ‘town 
of romance’. After that, a number of novels, films and popular music have been 
produced to strengthen this image. Since 2006, the ‘Chinese Valentine Festival’ has 
been launched in the old town of Lijiang in August each year. During the festival, 
various programmes like cultural performances, dance and singing have been staged 
in the town to attract young tourist couples to celebrate the Chinese Valentine Day 
(qixi). It is still unclear how far the custom of committing suicide is linked to the 
modern image of the ‘town of romance’, but the custom does romanticize the tourist 
imaginaries of Lijiang, especially for young couples from urban areas.  
 
The second element of tourist imaginaries of love originates from the ‘walking 
marriage’ custom of the Mosuo people who are officially identified as a branch of 
the Naxi in the Yunnan Province
3
. In the Mosuo community, the Western conception 
of marriage is replaced by the ‘walking marriage’—a unique marriage custom that is 
deeply rooted in the Mosuo’s social and cultural tradition of the matrilineal family 
system. The marriage and the propagation of offspring are realized by men who 
‘walk’ at night, spend time with women and return home early next morning. The 
couples do not marry each other, and both of them stay in their own matrilineal 
families for their whole life. Children that come out of such relationships are raised 
by their mothers and the mothers’ families. It is possible for a Mosuo woman to 
change partners as often as she likes—and in fact, the majority of Mosuo women 
only have one partner at a time. The ‘walking marriage’ custom is described as 
“serial monogamy” (Yang and Mathieu, 2003) and, indeed, many such pairings may 
last for a lifetime. 
 
The Mosuo culture initially became well-known nationally by way of the book 
Walk out of the Kingdom of Women written by a local Mosuo girl named Yang Erche 
Namu in the early 1990s. Hereafter, a large body of literature has been published to 
cultivate a mysterious atmosphere of love. The Mosuo’s matrilineal system and the 
walking marriage custom are described in terms of various images of romance, such 
as “the living fossil of matrilineal kingdom,” “the mysterious eastern kingdom of 
Women”, or “the last matrilineal family of human being”. However, due to the 
commercial promotion by tourism operators, ethnic elites, and the local government, 
the image of the Mosuo and their ‘walking marriage’ has been further romanticized 
and even misunderstood in the public. Most information about the Mosuo portray 
them as a sexually promiscuous culture in which women change partners frequently, 
and as a kind of sexual utopia where women often seduce men. This image has been 
                                                        
3
 Mosuo is a small ethnic group located at the border of the Yunnan and the Sichuan 
Province. Although Mosuo are culturally distinct from Naxi, the Chinese government has 
placed them officially in the group of Naxi since both of them originated from the group of 
ancient Na. Most Chinese tourists are not aware of the difference between these two groups 
and often fail to distinguish between them. 
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utilized particularly by tourism operators who seek to attract more tourists 
(especially men) to visit, with the result of developing the prostitution industry in the 
town.  
The emergence of images like the ‘town of romance’ and the ‘sexual utopia’ of 
Lijiang reflects the transition of the contemporary Chinese society. The social, 
political, and cultural transition in modern China have sped up the rhythm of 
urbanization, modernization and industrialization in the context of globalization. 
Chinese people, especially the young generation, are fed up with the modern urban 
life with conventional social norms and regulations; it is their demand to enter the 
liminal space of tourism, which provides them with opportunities to participate in the 
temporary forms of transgression, for example, the rites of freedom for love and 
romance. A young tourist travelling in Lijiang describes it like this: 
 
“How fantastic, that the Mosuo men have no love responsibility and family 
burden! How great, to chase girls on my trip to Lijiang, the town of romance, during 
the Chinese Valentine Festival” (personal conversation).  
 
The images of ‘dying for love’ and the ‘walking marriage’ are entangled, and 
create a perfect destination for Chinese urban tourists who are searching for 
romance. As indicated, these imaginaries are jointly produced by different actors 
including the local government and tourism operators and spread through books, 
television, newspapers and the internet. Tourists to Lijiang meet friends, celebrate 
the Valentine festivals, and spread their love affairs on the internet. The information 
circulation even stimulates the expectation of tourists for their imaginaries of this 
site, in which the bars of Lijiang become the perfect places for constructing the 
image of the romance. 
 
 
V. FROM BAR CULTURE TO YANYU 
 
Since the reform and opening up of China, bars gradually developed in the country. 
In big cities such as Beijing, Guangzhou and Shanghai, going to bars has become 
one of the major leisure activities for modern young people; they make new friends 
or release the stress resulting from their ordinary urban life. When bar culture 
entered Lijiang, global demands of consumption have channelized the cultural flow 
from urban cities into the town, putting new romance and erotic flavour into it. The 
commercial heritage site helps to ethnicize, eroticize and romanticize the tourism 
imaginaries of the bars in the town.  
 
There was no bar in Lijiang until in 1996 ‘Sakura King’ (shortened as Sakura) 
was opened as the first bar on Xinhua Street, which is close to Sifang Square, the 
centre of the town. When the owner of the bar first came to Lijiang as a tourist, he 
fell in love with a Korean girl called King. They decided to open a bar and named it 
‘Sakura King’ to memorize their love story. When the bar opened, it was only a 
simple café with four tables and a few seats. Their customers mainly came from 
Japan, Hong Kong, Singapore and other developed countries. Along with the 
dramatic commercialization of the old town in 1999, Sakura quickly expanded its 
business to welcome the domestic mass tourists. Meanwhile, numerous businessmen 
came to Lijiang, bringing new capital into the local tourism industry. Many of them 
followed the example of the ‘Sakura Bar’ and opened their bars along the same 
street. Since 2005, this area is regarded as the ‘Bar Street’ (jiuba yitiao jie), and has 
become the most popular and lively area in the town especially in the evening.  
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The tourists have mainly two motivations to visit the site: first, a curiosity for 
the ethnic Naxi culture; and second, a search for leisure and relaxation from their 
stressful urban life. For them, a bar is a place both for gazing (Urry, 1990) and 
participating. The symbols that are created by the bars in Lijiang perfectly match 
these two motivations. Apart from the ethnic performance, the alcoholic drink and 
the charming singers, the posters and the texts which decorate the walls of the bars 
become an important part of the bar culture to express these symbols. For example, 
some posters present the philosophy of leisure and enjoyment: ‘We have time when 
we don't know how to enjoy our life, but when we know how to enjoy our life, we 
don't have time’; ‘More bestiality, less humanity’; ‘It’s easy to make simple life 
complicated, but difficult to make complicated life simple’; ‘Too many choices 
means no choice; too many opportunities means no opportunity’. Some posters 
encourage the tourists to get drunk: ‘People can easily get drunk at the same time, 
but they have different reasons’; ‘Eat and drink, you will get healthier’; ‘It is a 
nightmare to get drunk but still keep awake’. Besides these texts, some posters 
encourage the tourists to start love affairs
4
 in the bars: ‘All the men in the world are 
Wu Song and all women are tigers made of paper
5’; ‘Hunting girls is the only basic 
principle for guys’; ‘Love affairs are not wild animals, but lovely deer you 
occasionally meet in the zoo’. These texts produce symbols to enhance the romantic 
atmosphere of the bars. 
 
As seen from different elements of bars, the tourist imaginaries created by the 
interaction between the tourists and the place release people from the ordinary life 
and lead them into a liminal space. The symbols, along with the texts on the posters, 
the love stories of the bar owners, the romantic candlelight and the ethnic love music 
motivate tourists to create their Lijiang stories in the bars. Different from the 
‘collective effervescence’, the term coined by Durkheim (2001) to illustrate the 
perceived energy that is formed by a gathering of people, the place of bars presents a 
collective experience of people meeting, communicating, relaxing, dancing to loud 
music, and sometimes searching for love affairs. 
 
The term ‘love affairs’ is translated into Chinese as yanyu. Initially, yanyu 
means a beautiful encounter for a romantic feeling with somebody or even 
something like the wind, the cloud or the Jade Dragon Mountain. As an old town 
with traditions like ‘committing suicide for love’ by the Naxi and the ‘walking 
marriages’ by the Mosuo that were later romanticized for tourism promotion, Lijiang 
changes its reputation from the ‘town of romance’ to the ‘town of yanyu’ with 
tourists searching for love affairs. Yanyu can be romantic and sensational, but it can 
also be erotic and profane. Whatever the tourists interpret and how they project the 
image of yanyu, bars in Lijiang create the space for love affairs. The gaze of tourists 
towards the mystery and ethnicity of the town, their demands of searching and 
exploring, and the romantic atmosphere in the bars jointly constructs the transition of 
the tourism imaginaries of the site. 
 
To sum up, the emergence of the bar street in Lijiang reflects the demands of 
modern tourists who come from urban cities and travel to this ‘exotic site’. These 
demands that arise from the tourists imaginaries of the destination stimulate them to 
participate in the temporary forms of transgressions and rites of consumption. The 
imaginaries are not solely based on the commercialized heritage site, neither on the 
                                                        
4
 In this context, it means searching for lovers in an unofficial relationship, very possibly as 
the form of a one-night stand. In Chinese it is called yanyu. 
5
 In the Chinese classic novel Water Margin (shuihu), Wu Song is a hero who kills a tiger 
after getting drunk. The analogy ‘tigers made of paper’ implies that hunting for women is 
easy. 
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alleged romance of acts such as ‘committing suicide for love’ and the ‘walking 
marriages’, nor on the booming bars phenomenon in the town. The imaginaries are 
embodied in multiple presentations of different faces of reality. In essence, the shift 
of tourism imaginaries from an exotic ethnic place and a commercial heritage site to 
a ‘town of yanyu’ and its circulation is based on the continuous transformation, 
diffusion and reconfiguration of the social network that involves different actors. As 
the major actors in the network, tourists received the symbols projected by the 
setting of the bars, and in turn produced new symbols through the unrestrained 
pursuit of hedonistic experiences. The tourist imaginaries add a special flavour to the 
tourist activities like yanyu, and give them meaning.  
 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
In the past two decades, tourism imaginaries of Lijiang have been produced, 
translated, negotiated and modified through the continuous circulation of the 
network and its flow of various actors. Tourism is embraced in such a way that the 
ancient town has to be popularized for the modern tourists, and made acceptable to 
the state authorities aiming to generate money for the city, as well as to the 
UNESCO, which is indirectly responsible for jettisoning the ancient town into the 
modern world. With the development of commercialization, the mass tourism helps 
to ethnicize, eroticize and romanticize the destination by the tourist gaze. In this 
context, the town has transformed its tourism imaginaries from a historic trade town 
to a commercial heritage site, to a town of romance, and even to a town of yanyu. In 
the bar street as a platform of the theme, the tourists enjoy their night-time with the 
expectation to search for love affairs. The ongoing transitional imaginaries are not 
created solely by the gaze. They are produced collaboratively by the tourism 
operators, the bar setting, the public media and the tourists themselves. The flow of 
different actors changes the structure of the network and promotes the social and 
cultural movements. Further, it stimulates the modified image of Lijiang as a tourism 
destination, and as a result revises the imaginaries of this place. 
 
To conclude, tourism imaginaries are neither abstract cultural subjects defined 
by scholars, nor the expression of pure personal feelings of tourists. They are 
continuous dynamics in the network that respects both the symbolic and the social 
value. The tourism imaginaries are not as free as they seem to be, but closely 
connected with the relations in its network and the flow of actors. Each transcultural 
encounter or intervention from the outsiders with localities articulates the continuous 
process of the stimulation for meaning-making and value changing. Hence, the 
complex of the network and the dynamic flow of varied actors result in the multiple 
nature of the tourism imaginaries. 
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EPILOGUE 
 
 
Bidisha Chaudhuri and Lion König 
 
 
This special issue is fairly dynamic not only because of its diversity of cases 
and contexts but also in terms of the way each case is looked at in a new 
transcultural perspective. In these wide-ranging cases transcending disciplinary 
boundaries, ideas, institutions and practices are understood as constantly shifting 
entities emerging out of the interplay between structure and agency which are shaped 
by and embedded in the particular socio-cultural contexts. While on the one hand 
these papers uphold the significance of a context-specific analysis, on the other hand 
all of them draw our attention to the entangled nature of the phenomenon they 
espouse to study, be it citizenship or ‘good governance’, diplomacy, or tourism 
imaginaries. In weaving these seemingly divergent aspects together, the papers adopt 
a transcultural lens where all ideas, institutions and practices are understood as part 
of larger transcultural flows which are simultaneously absorbed and adapted. It is 
this very transcultural understanding that holds these rather disparate papers in a 
coherent whole.  
 
Transculturality is an emerging and discursive process which challenges 
existing paradigms of the social sciences and the humanities for their monolithic 
frame of reference. As has already been mentioned in the introduction, the grand 
theoretical narratives of our times have mostly originated out of the particular 
historical junctures of Western Europe and hence carry with them inherent 
Eurocentric traits, which in turn render all other societies somewhat deviant or 
deficient. Transculturality with its analytical toolbox of flows, asymmetry, agency, 
and hybridity helps operationalise concepts which are more suited to contextual 
fabrics of different societies and polities.  
 
Given this understanding of a transcultural perspective, it becomes imperative 
to explore Islamic political thought along with the modern political thought to fully 
comprehend Muslim citizen identity in postcolonial India, or to increasingly focus 
on the concept of ‘cultural citizenship’ in order to capture the hybridising strategy of 
cultural policy making and mass-media representation of citizen identity within a 
particular context. Similarly, the hackneyed modernising nature of a ‘good 
governance’ paradigm which thrives more on the supposed moral supremacy of a 
certain ideology than on the objective realities of rural India becomes even more 
evident under a transcultural lens. Also in the Chinese context, be it ‘public 
diplomacy’ or ‘tourism imaginaries’, flows of ideas and actors and their constant 
interaction with the structural forces reveal their being embedded in a wider 
transcultural process grappling with asymmetry and producing hybrid entities 
simultaneously.  
 
In so far as these papers strive to present the importance of a transcultural 
perspective, we nevertheless deliberately refrain from defining transculturality. As a 
discursive process, transculturality transcends many analytical boundaries and hence 
defies all attempts to be confined to a single definition, as this would mean falling 
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into the same essentialist trap that it sets out to refute. At the same time, 
contributions in this special issue are all part of ongoing research dealing with rather 
amorphous concepts that are far from being clear-cut and thoroughly theorized. 
Therefore, the findings presented here are neither conclusive nor inert. Instead, this 
issue, with much humility, attempts to mark a point of departure in the broader 
debate on the widespread Eurocentrism of social science and the evolving 
transcultural turn. 
 
The transcultural discourse as represented through these diverse contributions 
will hopefully appeal to scholars and policy-makers in a similar manner. Though 
especially analysing heterogeneous societies such as China and India, the papers in 
this issue do not intend to present them either as unique cases or as prototypes of 
non-Western developing societies. Instead, the overall aim is to sieve out some 
generalised arguments which can add rigour to the explanatory potential of a 
transcultural perspective across societies. In this sense, the Chinese and Indian 
contexts as analysed against the background of a transcultural framework will also 
have significant implications for Western societies which are more and more 
struggling with the issues of accommodation of diverse groups at a time when the 
the nation-state as originally conceptualized is severely challenged. Thus, the papers 
assembled here through their case studies contribute to an enhanced understanding of 
the politics underlying citizenship, governance, diplomacy and heritage, and thereby 
enrich the analytical as well as the methodological framework of comparative 
politics. With regard to the policy implications of such academic research, the entire 
gamut of policy-making endeavours in most of the developing countries is heavily 
influenced by the Western development paradigm. In their own ways, all the papers 
highlight the inadequacy of such paradigms not only in non-Western contexts but 
also in the fast-changing Western societies. Therefore, by turning to the structure-
agency relationship, by focussing more on conflicts and asymmetries within the 
system, and by taking recourse to hybridisation as a political strategy, a policy 
formulation can be brought about which is informed by a transcultural perspective. 
Such an approach might in fact be better suited to deal with the realities of post-
modern societies across the globe. 
 
 
